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Corporation tax and individual income tax in  the European  Communities 
by 
Professor Dr.  A.J. van den  Tempel 
Tax  harmonization  involves  the  important  and  urgent 
task of aligning the structures of corporation tax in  the 
Community, and consequently the question of the taxa-
tion of undistributed versus that of distributed corporate 
profits.  The present study looks  into the  main  aspects 
of this exceedingly difficult subject. It has been carried 
out  by  Professor A.J.  van  den  Tempel  at the  request 
of the  Commission of the  European Communities. 
The terms of reference for the study were: 
(i) To  examine  the  case  for  mitigation  of economic 
double taxation of dividends; 
(ii)  To  give  a  comparative  account  of the economic, 
financial and social implications, as regards relations 
between  member  countries  and  relations  between 
the  Community  and  non-member  countries,  of 
different methods of doing so; 
(iii)  To examine the  disadvantages for  the  Community 
having  a  variety  of corporation  tax  structures  in 
the  various member countries, and to suggest ways 
and  means  of mitigating  these  disadvantages  until 
such  time  as  a  harmonized  system  of corporation 
tax enters into force. 
3 
Professor van den Tempel deals mainly with the systems 
current  in  the  Community,  i.e.  the  classic  system 
(Netherlands,  Luxembourg),  the  tax  credit  system 
(France, Belgium) and the split-rate system (Germany). 
But he also considers other systems such as that of com-
plete  avoidance  of economic  double  taxation  of divi-
dends, that of "tax transparency" for joint stock compa-
nies,  and  the  system involving deduction of a primary 
dividend from corporate profits. 
The author  shows  how  the various  systems work  in  a 
closed and an open economy and examines the implica-
tions  of applying one or the other system.  He concen-
trates  in  particular  on  a  projection  of  the  different 
national  systems into Community level  and the effects 
they  would  have  within  the  Community  and  in  the 
Community's  relations  with  non-member  countries. 
In the final  section  Professor van den Tempel outlines 
ideas on  a harmonized system for the Community and 
arrives at the conclusion that the classic system of  corpo-
ration tax would best meet the Community's needs. 
The Commission wishes to express its gratitude to Pro-
fessor van den Tempel for this important work. 
Responsibility for the conclusions expressed in the study 
is, of course, solely the author's. TABLE OF CONTENTS 
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39 CORPORATION TAX AND INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 
IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
I-Interpretation of the mandate 
I.  Since World War II much attention has been given 
in  Western Europe by the legislative bodies and in  the 
scientific  literature to the question of how the taxation 
of the  profit of entities  and  the  individual  income tax 
on  natural  persons  are  to  be  related  to  one  another. 
Naturally,  this  aspect of the  tax  structure  is  no  more 
than a segment of the whole of the problems of a social 
and  financial-economic  nature  which  are  evoked  by 
taxation,  or which  are  connected  with  it.  A  separate 
treatment,  however,  of the  problem  of the  relation  of 
corporation tax  and individual income tax is  useful,  in 
order to judge the various structures which are possible 
by their qualities and to compare them with each other. 
Of the many possible systems, three particular systems 
are  most  widely  used  in  practice  and  are  compared 
with each other: 
A.  The classic system 
The corporation tax and the synthetic (affecting the entire 
income)  individual  income  tax of natural  persons,  are 
independent.  The  rate  of the  corporation  tax  is  the 
same  for  the  retained  and  for  the  distributed  profit. 
For the  individual  income  tax,  the  dividends  received 
by the shareholders are taxed in the same way as any 
other income. This system exists now in Luxemburg, the 
Netherlands  and  in  the  United  Kingdom.  Formerly, 
it  existed  in  the  Federal  German  Republic  and  in 
France. 
B.  The system of the double rate 
In  order  to  reduce  the  economic  double  taxation  on 
dividends a lower rate of corporation tax exists for the 
distributed  profit  of  the  share  company  than  for  its 
other  profit.  Then  the  dividend  is  taxed just as  any 
other income for the purposes of the individual income 
tax. The relief to mitigate economic double taxation has 
therefore  been  performed  at the  company  level.  This 
system exists in the Federal German Republic: the two 
rates  of  the  Korperschaftsteuer  for  the  public  share 
company  (Kapitalmarktbezogene  Gesellschaft)  are 
now 51% and 15%. 
C.  The credit system 
The  rate  of the  corporation  tax  is  the  same  for  the 
retained  and  the distributed  profit.  In order to reduce 
the economic double taxation of dividends, part of the 
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corporation tax on distributed profit is  credited against 
the  individual  income  tax.  The relief to  mitigate  eco-
nomic  double  taxation  on  dividends  has  been applied 
here  at  the  shareholder  level.  This  system  exists  in 
France.  The  rate  of the  impot sur le  socihes is  50%; 
half  of  the  tax  charged  on  the  distributed  profit,  is 
credited.  In Belgium this  system forms the main struc-
ture:  however,  elements  of other  systems  have  also 
been included in the legislation. 
2.  The following concise chronicle of events in Western 
Europe  which  concern  the  subject  discussed,  shows 
that attention has mainly been paid to the three systems 
A, B and C mentioned above and furthermore, it cannot 
be  said that there has been a clear development in  the 
direction of one of them. 
1953  Germany switches from  the classic system to the 
system of the double rate. 
1960  The Dutch Government makes a proposal to Par-
liament  to switch from  the  classic  system to the 
system of the double rate. 
1962  The  Fiscal  and  Financial  Committee  advises,  in 
its  report  issued  to  the  European  Commission, 
the adoption of the  system of the double rate in 
the E.E.C. 
1962  Belgium  introduces,  with  the  transition from  the 
schedular  system  (separate  taxes  for  categories 
of income)  to  a  synthetic  individual  income  tax 
and corporation tax, a credit system combined with 
an element of the system of the double rate. 
1965  The United Kingdom  abolishes the credit system 
which  had  been  in  existence for a long time and 
switches to the classic system. 
1965  France  switches  from  the  classic  system  to  the 
credit system.  · 
1965  The  Dutch  government  withdraws  the  proposal 
of 1960  and announces  a  proposal for  the  intro-
duction of a credit system. 
1967  The  Wissenschaftliche  Beirat  of  the  German 
Bundesministerium der Finanzen advises a switch 
to the system of full credit of the  corporation tax 
on the distributed profit. 
1968  The  Dutch  Government  abandons  the  intention 
announced in 1965 and proposes, for the time being, 
to maintain the classic system. 
1968  The Italian  Government  decides  to  propose  the 
replacement of the  existing schedular tax system 
by the classic system. Luxemburg forms  a  centre of silence in the middle  of 
these changes. After having studied the various systems, 
the  Government  of Luxemburg  takes  the  view  that, 
pending  developments  in  the  E. E. C.,  maintenance  of 
the classic system is to be preferred. 
3.  In  the  discussion of the  details  of the  three  main 
types of systems, this study closely follows the character-
istics of those systems which are now met with in  five 
of the  E.E.C.  countries  and  in  the  United  Kingdom. 
The  strongly  diverging  Italian  tax  structure  is  not 
considered;  it  will,  if  the  intentions  of  the  Italian 
Government are carried  through,  be  abolished  and be 
replaced by  a  system which approaches the systems in 
the other countries mentioned. 
The systems A, Band C display great similarity. In the 
first  place,  they  all  include  a  synthetic,  progressive 
individual  income  tax  which  affects  the  income  of 
natural  persons,  including  dividends.  Also  in  respect 
of  the  corporation  tax,  they  show  many  important 
points of resemblance: 
i)  the  corporation  tax  is  an  independent  tax  on  the 
profit of entities; 
ii)  the  corporation tax is  imposed on the entire profit 
of share companies; and 
iii) the  corporation  tax  is  at  any  rate  partly  a  "real 
corporation  tax",  in  the  sense  that  it  is  imposed 
without trying to prevent "economic double taxation". 
It is true that in Belgium, Germany and France the eco-
nomic double taxation is moderated, but this moderation 
does  not go further than that about half of the  burden 
of the  corporation  tax  on  the  distributed  part of the 
profit is taken away. 
4.  In  chapter  IV  three  other systems  are  summarily 
discussed, each of them with respect to one of the items 
i),  ii)  and iii)  mentioned in section 3 diverging from the 
systems A,  B and C.  The systems discussed in chapter 
IV are the following: 
(a) the  system  of  complete  avoidance  of  economic 
double  taxation  on  dividends  (compare  section  3 
under iii); 
(b) the  system  of "transparence  fiscale"  of the  share 
company,  in  which  a  corporation  tax  in  the  usual 
sense is Jacking (compare section 3 under i); 
(c)  the  system  of deduction  of a  primary  dividend  of 
the profit (compare section 3 under ii). 
5.  As remarked in  section 3, none of the three systems 
A,  B and  C  provides for a complete avoidance of eco-
nomic double taxation on dividends. That these systems 
receive most attention, can also be ascribed to a practical 
consideration;  for  it  is  improbable  that  the  E.E.C. 
countries and  the  United  Kingdom  wiJJ  proceed to the 
abolition  of a  "real  corporation  tax".  On this  subject 
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one can speak of  a clear development. The two countries 
which quite recently did not have a real corporation tax, 
have both decided to introduce it; the United Kingdom 
introduced  a  partly  real  corporation tax  in  1937  and a 
complete  real  corporation  tax  in  1965,  whilst  Belgium 
introduced a partly real corporation tax in 1962. 
These  developments  mean  an  abandonment  of  the 
idea  that the  share  company  and  its  shareholders  can 
be  considered  as  being  identical.  Modern  industrial 
development  has  meant  that  notably  the  public  share 
company, of which the shares are quoted on the stock 
exchange, when seen from an economic and social point 
of view has an existence of its own, independent of that 
of its  shareholders.  This  impersonal  entity  aims  at its 
own maintenance and growth, with a view to the object 
to be achieved by it.  Its interests are to be found in the 
sphere  of production  and  are  not  the  same  as  the  in-
terest  of  the  shareholders.  The  idea  that  the  share 
company is a form of contractual co-operation, by means 
of which  the  joint  shareholders  run  an  enterprise,  is 
obsolete.  It is  the share company which has  the status 
of  entrepreneur  and  which  competes  both  with  its 
congeners  and  with  the enterprises of natural  persons. 
Its  income  cannot  exclusively  be  seen,  as  would  be 
convenient  in  the  absence  of a  real  corporation  tax, 
as partly already and partly not yet distributed dividend. 
6.  The foregoing  is  applicable to the big  public  share 
company.  In  many  cases  a  share  company  does  not 
display all the characteristics of this type and the typical 
private company does not comply with the characteristic 
given  at  all.  In  the  fiscal  field  the  private  company 
presents special problems which  are not, or to a much 
Jesser  degree,  to  be  found  with  respect  to  the  public 
share company. That special fiscal problem exists every-
where,  irrespective of the fact of whether the national 
legislation  does  or  does  not  recognize  separate  legal 
forms  for  the  private company, may it  be  true that, if 
these  exist,  the  taxation  law  will  often  take them into 
account. 
The  special  fiscal  problem  of  the  private  company 
proceeds  from  the  special  relation  between  the entity 
and  its  shareholders.  The  (majority-)  shareholders  at 
the same time control the share company; the relations 
between  the  shareholders still  have to some extent the 
character  of relations  between  partners.  The  conse-
quence of this is, on the one hand, that the shareholders 
experience  the  corporation  tax  as  a  burden  which 
affects them personnaly. The economic double taxation 
is  for them a psychological reality the more so, because 
a comparison with the entrepreneur operating as a sole 
proprietor is obvious. On the other hand it is certain that 
the "economic double taxation" in  fact means an addi-
tional burden, surpassing the one they would experience 
in the case of  a direct attribution of  the profit. In  the  determination  of the  size  of the  distributions 
and of the remuneration of the management, the personal 
interests of  the shareholders in the private share company 
and  the  interests  of the  share  company  have  equal 
attention.  Those interests can be  conflicting.  They can 
also  run  parallel.  Thus,  retention  of profit is  the most 
important and sometimes the only source or means for 
self-maintenance and  expansion of the  share company, 
in  absence  of admission  to  the  capital  market.  The 
retention of profit, however,  means  at the same time a 
tax  saving for the  shareholder personally.  The compli-
cated problem of the fiscal  regime  of the private share 
company has many facets.  This study confines itself to 
bringing  up  a  few  points  related  to the tax  structure. 
So the  items  mentioned above are discussed in  section 
46  and  sections 48-49;  one single  aspect of an interna-
tional nature is discussed in section 87. 
For the  rest,  the  public  share  company  stands  in  the 
foreground.  In  the  international  movement  of capital 
it occupies the most prominent place and it is especially 
this type or company for which a harmonized system for 
the  countries of the  European Communities has to be 
found. The accomplishment of such a harmonized system 
does not exclude special fiscal provisions for the private 
share company.  Reference may be made here to special 
rates existing in the Federal German Republic, to option 
rules existing in various countries (section 49 and section 
116)  and  to  provisions  counteracting  unjustified  fiscal 
advantages. 
7.  The diverging consequences of the taxes existing in 
the various countries do not only proceed, notably also 
as  to  their  effect  on  the  international  movement  of 
capital, from the differences in tax structure. 
Differences in  the manner of determining the tax base 
(profit, income) and in  the level of the rates can also be 
of  importance. 
In  this  study  the  problem  of the  computation  of the 
taxable profit and that of the limits of the income concept 
are not considered. Differences between the legislations 
on these items which are considered in another connec-
tion in  the  European Communities,1)  are not discussed 
here.  The  question  of on  which  level  the  burden  of 
direct taxation in general and the burden in the corporate 
sector in  particular has to be, also has to remain out of 
consideration.  In the judgment of the  actual  situation, 
both  have  to  be  taken  into  account.  This  study only 
aims at a comparison of the nature and the consequences 
of the structural differences in the relation of  corporation 
tax  and  individual  income  tax.  The structures  can all 
be applied to different levels of burden (rates and deter-
mination of the object). Within the framework of Euro-
pean integration in  the fiscal  field, this problem indeed 
1)  Report Working group IV on the basis for the computation of profits 
in the Member States. 
9 
has  an  independent significance.  A  structural harmoni-
zation can, as long as the countries have not yet effected 
a binding agreement with regard to the level of the rates 
and the determination of the tax base, remove numerous 
problems or reduce their significance. 
8.  In  Chapters  II  and  III  of  this  study  therefore 
proceed from the alternative application of the systems 
in  one and  the same  level of burden. Another starting-
point  could  also  have  been  the  drawback  that  the 
consequences  which  differences  in  the  level  of  the 
taxes  on  corporate  profits  and  on  dividends  might 
have  via  the  government  budget-e.g.  in  the  form 
of  higher  indirect  taxes  or  higher  government 
expenditure-and  the  influences  which  those  dif-
ferences  could  exercise  on  international  economic 
relations  would  have  to  be  taken  into  consideration. 
The gross burden of  the taxes in the sector discussed here 
could  no  longer-as  happens  hereafter-be  accepted 
as  standard  for  the  net  burden.  Thus  lower  indirect 
taxes may, via lower prices and wages, affect the profit-
ability of the enterprises. The ceteris paribus assumption 
which has been made in this study in the comparison of 
the effect of the systems has been accepted as a working-
method, extends-as  the  above shows already-also to 
the  entire  burden of taxation  and  its  influence  on  the 
economic data. 
9.  If  therefore, for a judgment of the systems, a compa-
rison  at  an  identical  level  in  the  corporate  sector is 
the best starting-point, the difference in the structure of 
the systems does not make it easy to eliminate the factor 
of a  difference  in  level.  As a  measure of whether the 
level of the burden in the various systems is equal, the 
most usable criterion would  seem to be the joint yield 
of the tax on the profit of the  share company and of 
the  tax on  the  dividends  of the  shareholder.  This ap-
proach has  the  advantage  that in  the judgment of the 
relative  merits  of the  systems  the  aspect  of the  tax 
proceeds can be disregarded. 
A comparison on this basis, as much as it may seem to 
be the most usable, can only be approximate. Reference 
is made to the remarks in section 16. Thus the influence 
of the systems on the size of profit distributions is  not 
known. Changes in the circumstances can be an influence 
on  the  distribution  quota  in  the  share companies  and 
thus, according to the rates of the corporation tax and 
the individual income tax, have diverging consequences 
for the tax proceeds. Notwithstanding these difficulties, 
an attempt has been made hereinafter, in the form of a 
few schematic examples (see those in section 19 et seq.), 
to indicate which order of size the differences between 
the rates of the various systems must have in order for 
them to be comparable. 10.  The following  have been considered to be beyond 
the framework of  the mandate for this report: 
i)  taxation  of the  share  company by other standards 
than its profit, such as taxes imposed on the capital 
paid-in at the creation of the enterprise or in capital 
increases (a draft-directive in  respect of these taxes 
has been submitted by the European Commission to 
the  Council  of Ministers  in  December  1964)  and 
periodic net wealth taxes; 
ii)  taxes  which  affect  enterprises  irrespective of their 
legal form, such as the Gewerbesteuer in the Federal 
German Republic; 
iii) the taxation of entities other than the share company, 
an  important group of which are the co-operatives, 
whose  special  aspects  of  an  organizational  and 
socio-economic  nature  deserve  specail  attention in 
each system; and 
iv) the taxation of  capital gains, also as far as the rationale 
lies  in the retention of profit by private share com-
panies. 
11.  Furthermore, numerous particulars in the national 
laws in respect of the taxation of profits and dividends 
which  are  not  characteristic  for  the  type  of system 
applied,  have been left  aside;  such as  specail  regimes 
for  certain categories of enterprises and legal  concep-
tions existing in certain countries (e.g.  the Organlehre, 
the principle of the worldwide profit or the consolidated 
profit of concerns, etc.). It is presumed that the degree 
of implementation of the legal provisions is alsways the 
same.  It is  also  assumed that the systems  have  been 
established for a considerable time, and the consequences 
which  may  arise,  when  switching from  one system to 
another,  during  the  period  of adaptation  to  the  new 
regime  are in  principle disregarded.  Some of these are 
mentioned  in  the  notes  to  section  31  and section 42. 
12.  The  study  has  been aimed  at  an  analysis  of the 
consequences of the application of the different systems. 
The term "economic double taxation" has been used for 
the sake of convenience, notwithstanding that a  value-
judgement  is  connected  with  it.  'Double  taxation"  is 
in  itself a term which is based on a formal criterion and 
which  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  desirability  or the 
undesirability  of the  phenomenon. The nature and the 
size of the consequences which manifest themselves in 
a certain method of taxation are decisive. Theories and 
principles are only raised in this study as far as this can 
clear up the argument. In the analysis of the machinery 
and the effects in Chapters 11-IV, in general an attempt 
has  been  made-certainly  not  always  with  succes-
to omit value-judgements, dependent as they are on the 
objects to be achieved and on the actual circumstances 
under  which  taxation  must  operate.  An  exception, 
however, are those value-judgments which-even when 
internationally  binding  standards  do  not  exist-find 
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support  in  aims  almost universally  accepted as  worth 
seeking, such as the principle of non-discrimination, or, 
in  relation to the European Communities in particular, 
can  be  considered  to  find  support  in  the  provisions 
of  the Treaty of  Rome. 
II-The  effects  of the  systems  A,  8  and C  in  a  closed 
national economic  system 
13.  In this chapter the effects of the systems A, Band 
C  in  a  closed  economy are  examined  with  a  view  to 
judging  the  efficiency  of  the  relief  of the  economic 
double  taxation of dividends.  The international aspects 
of the systems are not considered here. The crossing of 
the  border by  investments  and  participations in  enter-
prises causes complications, owing to the fact  that the 
taxation on both sides of the border has an influence on 
the financial  result.  Those complications are dealt with 
in Chapter III. In the present Chapter  first the mechanism 
of the systems and then the economic, social and fiscal-
technical  aspects in  the domestic sphere are discussed. 
"Domestic" refers to the territory of the national State, 
but also to the Common Market when a stage has been 
reached in  which the harmonization of the direct taxes 
will  have made big progress. 
I.  The mechanism of the systems 
14.  The discussion  is  based on perfect models  which 
have been chosen in such a way, that they are mutually 
comparable (see sections 7-9). A perfect model of a credit 
system is  that employed in  France. Both the rate of the 
French corporation tax (50%) and the part which comes 
into  consideration  for  crediting  against  the  individual 
income tax of the shareholders (half, i.e.  25  percentage 
points of the corporation) has hereafter been chosen as 
the  starting-point.  The  Belgian  legislation  also  has  the 
credit  system  as  its  main  structure.  Elements  of the 
system of a double rate and of the system of deduction 
of a primary dividend (this latter as a temporary constit-
uent),  however,  have  been  added  to  it.  Consequently 
the  effects  of those  systems  will  manifest  themselves 
simultaneously, strengthening or weakening each other, 
each according to the provision which has been made for 
them.  Much as it  may  be  accepted that in  the  Belgian 
situation  and  with  the  Belgian  fiscal  tradition  this 
synthesis has its own merits, as a starting-point it is not 
usable because of the complexity of its effects. 
15.  The chosen model of a system of a double rate has 
a strong resemblance to the system for the public share 
company existing in  the Federal German Republic. The 
high  rate  prevailing  for  the  non-distributed  profit,  is 
equated with that of the French corporation tax. The low 
rate for distributed profit has been chosen in such a way 
that, in accordance with the situation in France, an inte-
gration degree of 50%  is  achieved, which means that in the case of complete distribution of the available profit 
the  burden  of the  corporation  tax  is  reduced  to  half 
of the  full  rate, i.e.  to 25% of the profit.  The German 
rates  of 51%  and  15%  have therefore been replaced by 
rates  of  50%  and  162/3%.  When  distributing  75%  of 
the profit, the corporation tax at these rates amounts to 
162/3% of 75 plus 50% of 25, i.e.  an effective 25%. This 
conformity  in  the  result  of the  system  with  a  double 
rate and that of the system of  credit is to be found with the 
chosen  rates  in  each  dividend  quota  (see  sections  19 
et seq.). 
16.  In  the "classic system" the choice of a rate which 
makes  the  system  comparable  with  the  former  two 
models in the sense of the factors indicated in section 9, 
is  more  difficult.  It  is  assumed that with  a  rate of the 
corporation  tax  of 40%  roughly  the  same  tax  yield  is 
achieved as under the chosen models for systems B and 
C. The chosen rate of 40% resembles that in Luxemburg; 
it  is  a  little  lower than  the existing  rate for  the corpo-
ration  tax in  the  United  Kingdom  (421/2%) and  rather 
considerably lower than the rate of the Dutch corporation 
tax (46%). 
I 7.  A  few  examples  are  given  below  to  demonstrate 
the  effects  of the  systems  when  applied  alternatively, 
under  ceteris  paribus  assumptions  ignoring  secondary 
consequences.  The  examples  are  only  intended  to  il-
lustrate  the  principal  characteristics. 
In  example  I it  has  been assumed that, on an average, 
half of the  profit,  after  imposition  of the  corporation 
tax, is distributed to natural persons. In the credit system, 
the shareholder not only receives the dividend, but also 
the  "avoir  fiscal"  connected  with  the  distribution, 
which embodies the right to the crediting of corporation 
tax and which, for the purposes of the individual income 
tax, is added to the dividend. 
The individual income tax imposed on the dividends in 
the  hands  of the  shareholders  has  been  fixed  at  an 
average  of 33 I/3%.  This  assumption,  which  as  far  as 
Germany and  France are concerned, will  probably not 
be  very  different  from  the actual  percentage, has  as a 
result that in system C the average individual income tax 
to  be  paid  is  just equal  to the credit.  Natural  persons 
owing  a  smaller  percentage  of individual  income  tax 
than  the  percentage  of the  credit,  have  the  difference 
refunded  in  France, but in  Belgium  there is  no refund. 
/8.  In  the  examples  given  below,  the  complication 
caused  by  the  existence  of a  dividend  tax  has  been 
omitted.  The  dividend  tax  mainly  has  significance  in 
the  domestic  sphere-unlike  the  international  cases 
(see  Chapter Ill)- from  a  point of view of collection 
and control.  A dividend  tax can occur in  all  tax struc-
tures discussed here, though it is less likely in system C, 
which indeed already contains as it were an advance levy 
on the individual  income tax  in  the form of half of the 
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corporation tax.  In France therefore, a dividend tax on 
dividends accruing to those who  have a  right to credit 
of corporation tax, viz. residents, is lacking (dividend tax 
is  retained  however  on  dividends  accruing  to  non-
residents).  In system  A  and  system  B a  dividend  tax 
is  usual; as a  rule  it has, however, no  influence on the 
tax amount finally  to be paid by domestic shareholders, 
because it  is  credited against the individual income tax 
(or,  if  the  dividend  is  received  by  a  share  company, 
against the corporation tax). 
/9.  Example I 
Assumptions: 50% distribution of  the profit after taxation; 
33 1/3% individual income tax. 
A.  B.  c. 
Classic  Double rate  Credit 
a.  Profit before taxa-
tion  100  100  100 
b. Corporation tax  40  50  50 
-101)  40 
c.  Profit after corpo-
ration tax  60  60  50 
d.  Retained profit  30  30  30 
e. Distribution  30  30  2()2) 
f.  Individual income  10  10  331/3 
tax  of302)= 10 
tax 
credit 10 
g.  Dividend after tax-
ation  20  20  20 
Appropriation of  profit:  A  B  c 
h.  Retained profit  30  30  30 
i.  Dividend after tax-
at  ion  20  20  20 
j. Corporation tax  40  40  50 
k.  Individual  income 
tax  10  10  -
I.  Tax  50  50  50 
Total  100  100  100 
1)  The corporation tax is  reduced by one third of the distribution of 30, because the 
rate of tax on the distribution is 162/3%, theretore 331/3% lower than the normal 
rate. 
2)  Including the "avoir fiscal" to the amount of half the distribution, the dividend 
amounts to 30. 
Should  the  average  individual  income  tax imposed on 
the dividend amount to 40% instead of 33 1/3%, then the 
individual  income  tax  (line  f  and  line  k)  in  all  three 
systems is  2 units greater and the dividend after taxation 
2 units less. The  appropriation  of profit  in  the  three  systems  will 
then be: 
retained profit  30 
dividend after taxation  18 
tax  52 
20.  The nature of the system can have an influence on 
the dividend quota, as will be discussed in sections 37 et 
seq.  In the following examples II and III it is  assumed 
that the  dividend  quota under system A is  lower than 
under the  systems  B  and  C.  In  order to facilitate  the 
comparison with example I, in example II for the systems 
21.  Example II 
Assumptions: in system B and C, 50% distribution of  the 
profit after taxation; 
in  system  A,  43.6%  distribution  of the 
profit after taxation; 
33 1/3% individual income tax. 
A.  B.  c. 
Classic  Double rate  Classic 
a.  Profit before taxa-
tion  100  50  100  100 
b. Corporation tax  41.5  -10  40  50 
c. Profit after corpo-
ration tax  58.5  60  50 
d. Retained profit  33  30  30 
e. Distribution  25.5  30  20 
f.  Individual income  8.5  10  -
tax  331/3% of 
30=10tax 
credit 10 
g.  Dividend after tax-
ation  17  20  20 
Appropriation of  profit: 
h. Retained profit  33  30  30 
i.  Dividend after tax-
a lion  17  20  20 
j. Corporation tax  41.5  40  50 
k.  Individual income 
tax  8.5  10  -
I.  Tax  50  50  50 
The notes under example I are also applicable here. 
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B and C a dividend quota identical with that of  example I 
is assumed and the same has been done for system A in 
example III. 
The  assumption  of an  equal  burden in  the  corporate 
sector in all systems has been maintained in example II, 
by proceeding from a higher rate of the corporation tax 
in system A than in example I. In the examples the point 
that the percentage of the individual income tax on the 
dividend in case of an alteration in the size of the distri-
butions,  will  change a little-ceteris paribus-in conse-
quence of the progression of the rate has been ignored. 
22.  Example Ill 
Assumptions: in  system  B and  C, 58%  distribution  of 
the profit after taxation; 
in system A, 50% distribution of the profit 
after taxation; 
33 1/3% individual income tax. 
A.  B.  c. 
Classic  Double rate  Credit 
a.  Profit before taxa-
tion  100  50  100  100 
b. Corporation tax  40  -12  38  50 
c. Profit after corpo-
ration tax  60  62  50 
d. Retained profit  30  26  26 
e.  Distribution  30  36  24 
f.  Individual income  10  12  -




g.  Dividend after tax-
ation  20  24  24 
Appropriation of  profit: 
h.  Retained profit  30  26  26 
i.  Dividend after tax-
ation  20  24  24 
j.  Corporation tax  40  38  50 
k.  Individual income 
tax  40  12  -
I.  Tax  50  50  50 
The notes under example I are mutatis mutandis also applicable here. 23.  Both  in  system  B  and  in  system C  the tax  relief 
is intended to moderate the "economic double taxation". 
The  difference  between  both  systems  is  sometimes 
indicated in such a way that system B allows the relief 
in  the scope of the corporation tax and system C does 
the  same  in  the  scope  of the  individual  income  tax. 
This characterization contains indications as to the differ-
ence in the effects to be expected, e.g. in the psycholog-
ical aspect. As to the consequences to be expected, and 
the additional regulations to be made in view thereof in 
the domestic application and in the application in interna-
tional  cases (Chapter Ill), the  difference  between the 
systems  is,  however,  better expressed  as  follows: 
(a) in  system B the relief is already granted at the point 
of distribution by the share company, without waiting 
to see if the dividend will be taxed (again); 
(b) in system C the relief is only granted when it appears 
that the dividend is taxed (again). 
24.  As is  evident from  section 23, system B has in the 
first instance the effect that each recipient of a dividend 
benefits from  the reduced rate.  In accordance with the 
scope of the system, this effect has to be avoided when 
there  is  no  economic  double  taxation,  on  account of 
the fact  that the second phase of imposition is  absent. 
This is  the case when the dividend is  received tax free 
by some other share company.  1) 
25.  The rules  concerning the tax free  receipt of divi-
dends  in  the  domestic sphere-the other cases will  be 
discussed  in  chapter III-can go  more  or less far  in-
dependently  of the  tax  structure.  They go  farthest  in 
Belgium  and  the  United  Kingdom,  where  dividends 
received on shares in a domestic share company remain 
untaxed  in  the hands  of the receiving  share  company 
(non  his in idem in the corporate sphere).  In Germany, 
France, Luxemburg and the Netherlands the exemption 
remains  restricted  to  dividends-possibly  reduced  by 
the  expenses,  whether  or  not  determined  "a  forfait", 
attached  to  the  participation-received  in  a  parent-
subsidiary  relationship  (participation  exemption, 
"Schachtel-privileg").2)  In order to have a  right to the 
"Schachtel-privileg",  the  participation  in  the  capital 
of the subsidiary company must exceed a certain mini-
mum  which in the countries mentioned has been deter-
mined in different ways. 
26.  A  withdrawal of the  relief in  system B for those 
dividend  amounts  which  have  not  been  redistributed 
1)  Apart  from  the  possibility  that  fiscal  consequences  are  connected 
with  the  non-distribution  of this  profit,  which can be the case with 
investment companies,  if  they  only  enjoy  freedom  from  tax on the 
condition of redistribution of the dividends received to investors. 
2) It is not yet known what regulation the tax reform being prepared in 
Italy will contain. 
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by the receiving share company can, if only participation 
dividends  are  exempted,  remain  restricted  to  those 
dividends.  The other dividends  in  the  receiving  share 
company are again subject to corporation tax; the relief 
from  double economic taxation has therefore not been 
granted erroneously. Under the wide non his in idem rule 
which  exists  in  Belgium  and  the  United  Kingdom, 
system  B would  mean that for  all  domestic  dividends 
which  are  not  passed on,  a  supplementary  tax  would 
be imposed. 
For technical reasons the supplementary taxation, even 
if it remains restricted to participation dividends, cannot 
take place at the level of the distributing share company. 
For the latter is  mostly not acquainted with the size of 
the holding of the shareholders and their fiscal place of 
establishment;  particularly  so  when,  as  in  the  E.E.C.-
countries  with  the  exception  of  Italy,  bearer  shares 
are  recognized.  In Germany  therefore,  the  additional 
collection  of the  tax  (N  achsteuer)  takes  place  at the 
level of the parent company. 
In order to  provide  completely  equal fiscal  treatment 
of financing from the business profit of a share company 
and  that  received  from  (exempted)  domestic  (subsi-
diary-)  dividends,  the  Nachsteuer  must  comprise  the 
full  ecart  between  the  two  rates  of system  B (in  the 
foreign cases the situation is different, see Chapter III). 
Accordingly also the German legislation. 
27.  In section 23  system C has been characterized as a 
system for the moderation of economic double taxation, 
whereby the relief is only granted when it appears that 
the dividend is  taxed (again). If  in the terminology the 
parallel with system B is carried further, then it can be 
stated that system C also provides for two rates, though 
this does not yet find expression in the imposition of the 
corporation  tax.  Part  of the  corporation  tax  is  with-
drawn by crediting this  part when it is certain that the 
dividend  is  affected  by  individual  income  tax  (or,  if 
received by a share company, by corporation tax).1)  In 
the other cases this part of the corporation tax is main-
tained.  This  is  therefore  also  the case  when  a  parent 
company does not pass on participation dividends which, 
in  that company,  are free  of tax.  The corporation tax 
which is not credited, plays here the part which in system 
B falls  to the "Nachsteuer" in the receiving share com-
pany. 
It is clear that in this respect system C, more accurately 
than system B, fits  in with the purport of both systems: 
the  restriction  of the taxation on dividends,  if double 
taxation indeed occurs. This concordance of purport and 
design leads to simplicity in the legal provisions. There 
is less chance of the occurrence of leaks through which 
low-taxed dividend can flow out without having paid the 
1)  In France the credit cannot lead to refund in this case. second toll  which justifies  the  lower imposition at the 
previous stage. 
28.  The simplicity of design of system C is, however, 
distorted by  the circumstance that a dividend can also 
be  distributed  from  profit which  has  not been  subject 
to the first  toll.  Not all  profits  of domestic share com-
panies are affected by the corporation tax; furthermore 
taxed profit is  not always subject to the normal rate. A 
consistent application  of the  system leads, as  happens 
in  France, to no right to credit being attached to a divi-
dend accruing from exempted profit elements. The tech-
nical complications resulting from this will be discussed 
in section 71. 
2.  Shifting of tax 
29.  Formerly it was usually assumed that the problem 
of shifting  did  not play a part in  taxes on income and 
profit. Those taxes were considered to simply reduce by 
the  amount  imposed  the  net-surplus,  which  was  their 
object, so that the burden of taxation fell where it should 
be,  in  accordance with  the  wishes  of the legislator. It 
was  taken for  granted  that  taxes  of this  kind  had  no 
influence on the prices which were established between 
the taxpayer and others:  buyers or suppliers of goods, 
labour  or capital.  The  certainty  of those  assumptions 
has  among  other  things  been  affected  by  the  insight 
that the object of individual income tax and corporation 
tax,  both  for  entrepreneurs  and  non-entrepreneurs,  is 
not always a  surplus in the economic sense, but that it 
contains elements which can be considered as sacrifices 
made.  The  tax  on  such  elements  of income  or profit 
can in principJe be eligible for shifting, just as any normal 
indirect tax.  Besides, a broadening of the theory by the 
addition of macro-economic views has led to the insight 
that,  under  certain  circumstances,  pure  surplus  taxes 
can  also  be  shifted  by  the  nominal  taxpayer.  Neither 
theoretical  analysis,  nor  the  empirical  investigation 
carried  out  especially  in  recent  years,  can,  however, 
indicate  with certainty under which  circumstances and 
to  which  degree,  shifting  of tax  takes  place.  Indeed 
the  investigation  has  led  to the  knowledge,  that  it  is 
fairly certain that certain factors stimulate or counteract 
shifting, but a quantitative determination of the influence 
of these factors  separately, and of their combination in 
a real situation, has for the time being not proved to be 
possible. 
In  the  actual  practice  of tax  and  budgetary  policy, 
usually no allowance is made for the shifting of corpora-
tion tax and individual income tax. So the yield of a rate 
increase  of  the  corporation  tax  is  usually  estimated 
without taking into account the possibility that the tax 
increase enlarges the profit before taxation in the manner 
of higher  selling  prices  or lower cost,  and affects  the 
scope for  distributions to a lesser extent than is  to be 
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expected if only the direct effect of the increase is taken 
into consideration. 
30.  In this study phenomenon of the shifting of tax to 
its full  extent is  not under discussion. The question of 
the shifting has only to be considered within the restricted 
framework  of a  comparison  of different  structures  of 
corporation taxes and individual income tax, whereby a 
starting-point  is  that these solutions have a practically 
identical  budgetary  result.  An  examination of the  dif-
ferences  between  those  structures  could  produce  in-
dications  which  make  it  probable  that  in  one  system 
there is  more shifting of tax than in another. 
31.  When  comparing  the  systems  by  the  examples 
given  in  section  19  et  seq.,  the  first  striking  feature 
is  that,  compared  with  the  systems  A  and  B,  in  the 
credit  system  C  tax is  imposed to a greater extent on 
the share company and to a lesser extent on the share-
holder.  A  comparison with the system of a double rate 
indicates that this  characteristic becomes more striking 
when  the  distribution  quota  increases  (example  III). 
Now,  it  is  generally  accepted  that  the  proportionate 
tax  on  profit,-in  any  case  as  far as  it  is imposed on 
what  from  a business economic point of view is  to be 
considered as expenses-in branches of industry where 
the corporate form prevails, is more suitable for shifting 
than  the  individual  income  tax.  This  train of thought 
could  lead  to the conclusion that in  the credit system 
there is  more shifting than in  the other systems, even if 
the shareholder gets  a credit on account of that corpo-
ration  tax.  But it  is  equally justifiable to assume  that 
the  part  of the  corporation tax  to  be  credited  has  no 
other consequences  than a  dividend  tax  which  is  also 
paid by the company, but for the account of the share-
holders.1) 
32.  With  a  higher  distribution  quota  (example  III), 
system  B shows  the reverse position from  that shown 
under system C.  Compared with the classic system, the 
corporation tax imposed is slightly lower also in the case 
of a  rather higher distribution quota.  It is  not excluded 
that-assuming  that  the  shifting  possibilities  in  respect 
of corporation tax are greater than with regard to indi-
vidual income tax-higher distributions under the system 
of the  double  rate lead to a decrease of the shifting of 
tax and consequently to a somewhat lower profit before 
tax. It is true that in system B which taxes the distributed 
profit  lightly  at the  level  of the  company,  a  relatively 
high  dividend tax fits  in as  (provisional) additional tax. 
1) In this connection it is  to be noted that with the introduction of the 
credit  system in  France, the  dividend  tax  on dividends  accruing to 
residents  has  aJso  been  abolished.  At  the  same  time,  the  tax relief 
accompanying the alteration of the tax structure became evident to the 
shareholder at the moment of his assessment to individual income tax. 
See also the note to section 42. As a rule, however, it is assumed that a reverse tendency 
does  not  proceed  from  that  tax.  It  is  true,  however, 
that the individual  income tax makes  the delay  in  col-
lection slighter than might be deduced from examples I I 
and III. 
33.  Furthermore  there  is  the  question  of  whether 
there  is  a  difference  in  shifting  between  corporation 
tax imposed on retained profit and that which, without 
being eligible for a credit against individual income tax, 
is  imposed on the distributed profit.  Attribution of the 
tax to those two profit appropriations, produces character-
istic differences between the systems. It can be derived 
from  the example  I that the amount of corporation tax 
which must be paid is: 
Corporation tax under system: 
A  B  c 
in order to retain 30  20  30  30 
in order to distribute 301)  20  1()2)  103) 
1)  In system C the "avoir fiscal" is reckoned to belong to the dividend. 
2)  162/3% of 30 and 50% of 10 tax. 
3 )  On a profit of 40, 20 corporation tax is imposed, 10 of which is definite; the other 
10 is an advance levy (see note I)) and is here considered as individual income tax 
(see, however, section 31). 
As  regards  other  retention  and  distribution  quotas  it 
should  be  stated  that,  over  and  above  the  amount 
necessary  for  the  appropriation  indicated  above,  the 
following  percentage of it must be available for perma-
nent of taxes ("tax quota"): 
"tax quota" in 
system A  system B  system C 
on retentions  662/3%  100%  100% 
on distributions  662/3%  331/3%  331/3% 
34.  To prove that the corporation tax imposed on the 
profit appropriated for distribution is shifted to a greater 
extent than the tax on the retained profit, it is sometimes 
argued that for the share company, especially in view of 
the acquisition of fresh capital, a certain level of distri-
butions to  its  shareholders is  necessary. The minimum 
of necessary distributions  would be for the share com-
pany practically equal to a business expense. The level 
of those  distributions  does  not  necessarily  have  to be 
equal  to  the  yield  of other forms  of investment which 
compete with  shares on the capital market, since other 
aspects than the yield have influence on the demand for 
investment  objects.  But,  in  fact,  a  certain equilibrium 
between the yield levels will  arise. The share company 
which  distributes  relatively  little  does  not come up to 
the  expectations of the  market.  In order to reach this 
level,  a  share company,  compared with  other forms  of 
investment the yield of which is  not affected by corpo-
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ration tax, has to bear an extra burden. This burden, to 
be paid from the profit, would give rise to a shifting of 
tax through prices. 
35.  An essential part of this argument is the influence 
on the suppliers of capital, on the one hand of the yield 
and on the other hand of the other factors which are of 
significance for those suppliers.  The retention of profit 
also belongs to the other factors. The size of this, just as 
the  size  of the distributions,  can be infl1.1enced  by  the 
"tax quota" which, as  much as  the "tax quota" on the 
distributions, varies in the systems discussed, but in  an 
opposite sense. This means that for the conclusion to be 
drawn  from  the  trend  of thought  discussed  here  it  is 
essential  to  know  whether the distribution of profit to 
a  considerably  greater  extent  than  retention  of profit, 
contributes to the standing of a  share company on the 
capital  market.  Various  signs  indicate  that  the  yield, 
which in the past was certainly of  paramount importance, 
loses more and more its primary significance. The bigger 
or more experienced investor attaches value to an ample 
retention  of profit  which just occurs commonly in  the 
case of fast-growing and industries which forsee further 
profit  possibilities.  In  addition  to  this,  the greater part 
of the privately owned shares, belongs to investors in the 
high income groups.  For them retention of profit has the 
attraction that increase in value of the share in case of 
realization remains untaxed or is taxed at comparatively 
low  rates.  Retention  of  profit  represents  for  these 
investors a tax saving.  "Growth shares" also owe their 
increasing popularity to this factor. 
36.  Also if one comes to the conclusion that it cannot 
be  stated with  some certainty that one of the  systems 
discussed  leads to  shifting of tax more than the other, 
the  question  remains  of whether  the  corporation  tax 
cannot influence the course of the flow of capital, in the 
sense that the corporation tax forms a bar which weakens 
the  strenght  of the  flow  to  the  corporate  sector.  In 
all  three  systems  discussed  this  influence  can  occur, 
if  the  corporate  sector,  in  proportion  to  the  other 
sectors,  is  excessively  taxed.  The  reverse  effect 
can  also  happen,  in  that  case  a  "run  for  the  cor-
porate  form"  will  be  the  consequence.  The  deter-
mination  of the  correct  level  of the  burden  is, how-
ever,  beyond  the  scope of the  subject discussed here 
(see section 7). 
3.  The influence on the dividend quota 
37.  In favour of systems Band C it is argued that they 
stimulate an  increase of distributions at the cost of re-
tained profit.  The "tax quota" (see section 33)  is  lower 
on dividends than on retained  profit.  In system B this 
effect  will  be  expressed in  a  higher declared dividend, 
and in  system C in  a higher dividend amount available, 
after  taxation,  for  the  shareholder.  The  alteration  in the  proportion,  after taxation,  between the  distributed 
and the retained profit, leads according to this trend of 
thought to an expansion of the capital market. The selec-
tive  judgement  of the  demand  on  that  market  by  the 
suppliers of capital would improve the allocation of the 
national  resources,  whilst  the  self-financing  to  which 
the managers have a tendency, would be moderated by 
the fiscal  stimulus.  In the past similar arguments have 
been  adduced  for  a  differentiation  in  the  taxation  of 
retention and distribution, e.g.  in the form of an undistri-
buted profits tax. 
38.  The  stimulus  to  distribution  becomes  a  stimulus 
to  immediate  distribution  if the  mitigation  of the  eco-
nomic double taxation is only granted in respect of profit 
distributions for the year in which the profit has arisen. 
Such  a  restriction of the  tax reduction  with  respect to 
the distribution of annual profit is  for technical reasons 
(section 69)  desirable in  system B (even preferable is  a 
restriction to the maximal annual profit-after-corporation 
tax which in the chosen types of system B and C amounts 
to 75%  of the  profit).  In system C  such a limitation in 
time is  necessary in  as far as it must be prevented that 
profit  arising  under  previous  tax  regimes  benefits  as 
it  were retroactively by the new regime; administrative 
considerations  in  addition  explain  the  restriction  in 
force  in  France of the credit to  dividend coming from 
the  taxable  profit  of the  last  five  years.  In that  case 
also, however, unlike in system B,  there remains scope 
for a policy of dividend-equalization. 
39.  The counterpart of the systems B and C are those 
tax  measures  which  stimulate  the  retention  of profit 
by  connecting  a  higher  "tax quota"  to  distributions 
than to retained profits.  The ordinary form  of this is  a 
tax  on  the  share  company  in  respect  of distributed 
profit, as  existed in  the Netherlands until  1940  and the 
profits  tax which existed in  the  United  Kingdom from 
1947  until  1958.  As arguments for such a tax it can be 
said  that  the  size  of the  national  savings  is  increased 
by  it  (compare  section  45),  that  the  financial  stability 
of enterprises becomes greater and that a free  scope is 
given  to  expanding industries and branches of industry 
which  by  their  greater  profitability  can  permit  them-
selves as a rule a lower dividend quota. 
40.  As  to  influence  of system  A  on the  distribution 
quota it  can be stated that, seen from  the point of view 
of  the  enterprise,  this  system  works  neutrally.  The 
"tax quota" is the same for retention and for distribution 
(section 33).  In favour of such an equal regime for both 
appropriations of profit it can be argued-apart from the 
macro-economic  effects  of an increase of the dividend 
quota  to  be  treated later-that  the judgment as  to the 
appropriation of profit can best be left to the enterprise 
itself; for it is  the enterprise which has the best know-
ledge  of the  dividend  policy  to  be  conducted,  taking 
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into account the liquidity now and in  the future and the 
necessity  of new  investments  for  the  maintenance  or 
the improvement of the market position. The enterprise 
bears  also  the  responsibility  for  decisions  to  proceed 
to an enduring increase of charges, which indeed occurs 
when self-financing is renounced, irrespective of  whether 
equity  capital  or loan  capital  is  attracted for  replace-
ment. 
Also the interests  of the  employees  are  concerned  in 
the maintenance, growth and prosperity of the business. 
The interests of the shareholders need not suffer; their 
interest, notably on a long term, is mostly also served by 
retention  of profit  (see  section  35).  These  arguments 
plead for  an  omission of fiscal  influence on these deci-
sions. 
41.  It  may  be  assumed  that the effects of systems  B 
and  C  in  favour  of a  higher  distribution  quota in  the 
public share company will remain restricted to a certain, 
as  a rule not very wide, margin.  The lower limit of that 
margin  is  formed by the distribution which, in  the light 
of the  dividend  policy  conducted  so  far  and  in  view 
of future  issues,  would  be  necessary in  any  case.  An 
upper limit  is  set on that margin by the necessary self-
financing of modernization and expansion investments. If 
the  investment  plans  exceed  the  investment  capacity, 
the margin will be lacking and the dividend will be restric-
ted to the unavoidable minimum. Also, in the case of in-
creasing  profit  this  margin  can  remain  small;  good 
profitability prospects encourage the tendency towards 
expansion.  On  the  other  hand  it  sometimes  happens 
that  enterprises,  notwithstanding  satisfactory  profits, 
show  little  inclination  to  expansion,  for  whatever 
reasons.  Here  the  stimulus  has  in  principle  a  wider 
field of activity. Also the low "tax quota" on the dividend 
will  bring weak enterprises sooner to a position to main-
tain their dividend. 
42.  However much a certain influence of the systems B 
and C on the dividend quota in the public share company 
may  be  assumed,  that  influence  cannot  be  quantified. 
Empirical  investigation  also  cannot  give  sufficient 
indications as to the size of the effect, because numerous 
factors  other  than  fiscal  ones  have  an-presumably 
much more important-influence on the dividend quota. 
In  the  Federal  German  Republic  system  B  existed 
from  1955  to  1958  with an ecart of 15%  between both 
rates.  This does not seem to have had a tangible effect 
on  the  distribution  quota.  Probably  a  smaller stimulus 
cannot bring about a change in the distribution of profit 
which  is  preferred  for  other  reasons.  The  experience 
in  the  Federal German Republic  since  1958,  when  the 
now  existing  ecart  of  36%  between  both  rates  was 
introduced, also does not give a clear picture. In France 
(switch in  1965  from  system A to C) and in  the United 
Kingdom (switch in  1965 from system C to A) transitory effects  probably  also  still  play  a  part  at  present.  1
) 
Besides, in  both cases the judgement is impeded by the 
fact  that  the  alteration  of the  system  was  associated 
with a change in the level of the burden. 
43.  A  bigger  dividend  quota under systems  B and C 
accrues  for  the  greater  part  to  the  shareholders.  In 
Example III, as compared with Example I (sections  19 
et seq.)  a reduction of the retained profit by 4 has been 
assumed;  with  the  rates  of that  example  the  dividend 
after taxation received in  total by  the shareholders also 
increases by  4.  These two quantities will  diverge if the 
individual  income  tax  payable  by  the  shareholder  is 
higher or lower than the rate-ecart in  system B or the 
credit in  system C.  But also in that case the amount by 
which  the  retained  profit  decreases,  will  reappear,  at 
least for the greater part, in  the available income (after 
taxation) of the shareholders. 
44.  The extra dividend which is  placed at the disposal 
of the family  households, will  be  spent for  the greater 
part  on  consumption.  The  dividends  coming  into  the 
hands of entities will  partly be passed on and therefore 
also, though to a smaller extent, be used for consumption 
purposes.  Assuming that the  marginal  consumption for 
the extra dividend is put at two thirds, one third remains 
available  for  the capital  market.  From the  side  of the 
share  companies  on the other hand,  there is  a smaller 
supply  and  a  greater  demand.  The  total  size  of the 
savings  will  be  smaller,  the  consumption-and  the 
yield  of  the  consumption  taxes-greater  than  would 
have been the case without the stimulus to distribution. 
45.  Such a shifting from enterprise savings to consump-
tion can be considered to  be desirable from  a point of 
view  of  socio-economic  considerations  of  a  general 
nature. Should, however, in view of the level of the eco-
nomic  growth,  a reduction of the size of the savings in 
itself not be considered to be desirable, then the effect 
1)  In the  period of introduction or abolition  system C shows a consid-
erable difference in effects as compared with the systems A and B.  In 
system C the taxation in the first phase, at the level of the share com-
pany,  in  the  form  of corporation  tax or precompte, is  heavier than 
in  the  two other systems.  It is  true that part of that tax is  refunded 
(credited) in  the second phase, but this only happens after some time 
and to taxpayers other than the company. Thus when switching from 
system A or system B to system C, if the level of the burden remains 
equal, the enterprises have to face higher tax obligations than would 
have been the case under the old system. To avoid this, the tax reform 
will at the same time have to introduce a tax reduction. An example is 
the tax reform in  France in  1965, whereby the rate of the corporation 
tax was  not increased with  the  introduction of the right  to a credit. 
The inclination of the enterprises to maintain the old dividend percen-
tage can lead to the position where the tax reduction at first entirely 
accrues to the shareholders (apart from the supplementary payment of 
individual  income tax by those shareholders).  A reaction can follow 
in  the following  years  in  the form  of dividends  lagging  behind with 
increasing  profits.  The budgetary and monetary effects are naturally 
also  governed  by  the  presence of a dividend tax  and the  regime  of 
advance payments (compare the note to section 31). 
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is  favourable if it is compensated from the fact that the 
allocation  of the  extra  supply  on  the  capital  market 
rises  in  quality  above  that  which  would  have  been 
obtained with retention. This is not probable. The selec-
tive effects of the capital market are already reduced by 
the fact  that they  are  not  accessible  to  all  enterprises 
or not on equal terms.  Besides, the effectiveness of the 
effects of the price mechanism on the capital market are 
affected by the circumstance that the information of the 
market parties, also in favourable cases, rests on a most 
uncertain basis, viz. on expectations in respect of future 
profitability.  The remark may  be  true that the survival 
of the  fattest  is  something  other  than  the  survival  of 
the fittest, it  is  only possible to grow fast through self-
financing,  if one can maintain a  high  profitability.  The 
giving  of some scope to enterprises showing vitality by 
their profitability, does  not need to give a worse result 
than the judgement by the capital market. It is therefore 
not likely  that an improvement of the appropriation of 
the  supplementary  amount  offered  is  achieved on the 
capital market to such a degree that it is counterbalanced 
by the shrinking of the size of the savings at the disposal 
of the enterprises by a multiple of that amount. 
46.  The private share company shows special character-
istics (section 6), which make it necessary to supplement 
the considerations in the foregoing sections. On the one 
hand the effect of the dividend declaration on the out-
side  world does not play a part. On the other hand the 
decisions on the dividend policy are strongly influenced 
by  the consequences for  the individual  income  tax of 
the  shareholders.  Usually  they  come  in  a higher tariff 
class than has been assumed in the examples of sections 
19 et seq. The consequent tendency to retention of profit 
occurring in private share companies has therefore many 
times  led  to  special  provisions  to  ensure the interests 
of the Revenue. The size of the distributions will depend 
on the point at which the  need of the shareholders for 
money for private use weighs more heavily than the fiscal 
sacrifice  on  distribution.  Systems  B and C  shift, com-
pared with  system  A,  the  burden from  distribution of 
profit to retention of profit. 
Higher withdrawals continue to demand a fiscal sacrifice, 
because  in  these  cases the  individual  income  tax will 
usually  surpass  the  mitigation  of the  corporation tax. 
It is nevertheless to be assumed that the size of the with-
drawals  under these systems will  be higher than under 
system A; probably, however, not much higher.  In the 
private share company as a rule the ceiling of the distri-
bution is low this company often having no choice other 
than  retention  of profit,  because  self-financing  forms 
practically the only source of capital for modernization 
and expansion.  The fiscal  charges of this self-financing 
under  systems  B and  C  are  higher as  compared with 
system A, in consequence of the higher rate on retained 
profits.  Self-financing becomes more expensive and the 
fiscal  position  more  unfavourable  than  that  of share companies  which  can  afford  more  distributions.  The 
private share company does not have access to the more 
ample means available on the capital market. 
4.  The  tax  structure  and  the  legal  form  of 
enterprises 
47.  In  this  section  a  problem  of fiscal  neutrality  is 
discussed, viz., the question of how to avoid the situation 
where  the  enterprise  with  the  legal  form  of a  share 
company  is  fiscally  at an advantage or a  disadvantage 
as  compared with the sole proprietorship. The problem 
has  two  aspects:  to  have  the  smaller-scale  business 
and the medium-sized business choose their legal form 
at will;  and the aspect of the competition between the 
large-scale business in  corporate form on the one hand 
and the sole proprietorship on the other hand. 
48.  None of the systems discussed is neutral in respect 
of the  legal  form  of the enterprise.  The individual  in-
come tax is in all systems progressive and the corporation 
tax  proportionate.  When  the  income  of the  individual 
entrepreneur  increases,  the  difference  between  the 
marginal  burden of the  individual  income  tax  and  the 
rate of the corporation tax becomes increasingly signifi-
cant.  In  the  total  of circumstances  which  make  the 
corporate  form  more  advantageous  than  the  direct 
conduct of the enterprise, the size of the profit (and of 
the  other income  of the  individual  entrepreneur) is  an 
important  factor,  but  numerous  other  circumstances 
are  also  of  importance,  such  as  the  amount  of the 
deductible  compensation  of the  management  and  the 
necessity of distributions  by the share company which 
again are subject to the individual income tax.  For the 
comparison  of the  systems it  will  be sufficient to  note 
that systems B and C are  more neutral  than  system A, 
in so far as both the prospect of fiscal advantage and the 
prospect  of fiscal  disadvantage  in  consequence of the 
transformation  of the  business  into  a  share  company 
become smaller.  The advantage is  smaller, because the 
rate of the corporation tax on retained profit is higher in 
systems B and C  than in system A, and the distance to 
the  top-rate  of the  individual  income tax smaller.  The 
disadvantage  is  smaller,  because  the  economic  double 
taxation  on  distributed profit  is  moderated in  systems 
B and C.  In private share companies the first mentioned 
aspect  will  presumably  be  much  more  important than 
the  second.  The  conclusion  must  be  then,  that  the 
switch to the corporate form  under the systems B and 
C has generally less fiscal significance than under system 
A, but will  mostly also be less attractive than under the 
last  mentioned  system.  Just  as  in  section  46,  it  also 
appears here that the fiscal position of the private share 
company  under systems  B  and C  is  a  little  more  un-
favourable than under system A. 
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49.  In all  systems, provisions are conceivable in order 
to prevent the situation where for small-scale or medium-
sized  business  the  corporate-form,  which  is  desirable 
or  even  necessary  for  private  law  and/or  business 
economic reasons, causes too heavy fiscal burdens. The 
chance of an extra burden is  reduced if the joint share-
holders  can opt for a  regime holding the possibility of 
fiscal  transparency with  respect to the share company, 
and  that  the  shareholders  are  taxed  as  if they  were 
directly  the  owners  of the  enterprise  and  as  if they 
enjoyed  as  income  a  share of the  profit proportionate 
to  their holding.  If that  possibility  of opting for fiscal 
transparency (see Chapter IV under b) exists, it may be 
assumed with substantial reason that, if no use is made of 
the  option,  in  any  case for  the  majority-shareholders, 
the "economic double taxation" whether or not mitigated 
does not mean an extra burden compared with individual 
income  tax  on the whole  profit.  For the reasons  men-
tioned in section 48 such a right to option has presumably 
more  significance  under systems  B and  C  than  under 
system A.  In a certain way some other method to detach 
the taxation from the legal form of the enterprise can be 
considered  as  a  counterpart of the  fiscal  transparency 
method. This method implies a uniform taxation on the 
profit  of enterprises,  irrespective  of their  legal  form. 
Withdrawals  from  sole proprietorships are regarded as 
a dividend for this form of taxation. One of the principal 
objections against such a business tax is that it affects the 
fundamental idea of the synthetic individual income tax. 
50.  The  second  aspect,  mentioned  in  section  47,  is 
that of the competition between the large-scale business 
in  corporate form on the one hand and sole proprietor-
ships  on  the  other hand.  Here the  attention  is  drawn 
above all  to the tax rate for the retained profit, because 
that part of the profit is  directly of significance to the 
expansion  capacity  of  the  share  company.  In  this 
respect, systems B and C contribute more to a balanced 
tax regime than system A. 
5.  The choice of the  means  of financing 
51.  In this section, just as in the foregoing, a neutrality 
problem  is  being  discussed.  Interest on loan capital is 
deductible  in  computing the  taxable  profit,  interest on 
the equity capital (or on the paid-in capital) is not. This 
difference in fiscal  treatment could be a stimulus to the 
use of financing by loan capital, instead of financing with 
equity capital, to a greater extent than is justified from a 
business economic, and than is  desirable from  a social 
economic, point of view. Some people are of the opinion 
that  by  emphasizing  the  fact  that  there  is  economic 
double taxation on dividends the essential drawback of 
the  existing  corporation  taxes  has  not  been indicated 
correctly.  That essential drawback would, in this argu-
ment,  rather  be  the difference  in  fiscal  treatment just 
mentioned of the financing cost in the business economic sense.  The  adequate  solution  is  sought  for  by  them 
through  providing  a  deduction for  a  primary  dividend 
which  usually,  on  considerations  of  principle  or  of 
practice, is  fixed  at a certain percentage of the paid-in 
capital. This line of thought is  discussed in Chapter IV 
under c.  Here, however, the significance of systems A, 
B and C for the choice of the means of financing is under 
consideration. 
52.  Systems  B and  C  do  not  imply  an  exemption  of 
dividends, but a mitigation of burden. That mitigation is 
applicable to the whole dividend, irrespective of the fact 
of whether  this  comprises a primary capital reward or 
surplus  profit  resulting  from  "rents".  Both  systems 
moderate  along  the  whole  line  the  fiscal  differences 
between interest on debentures and dividends.  In order 
to  be  able  to  pay  6%  dividend,  with  the  rates  of the 
examples,  10%  profit  before  taxation  is  needed  under 
system A, and under systems Band Conly 8% because 
the "tax quota" (section 33) under those systems amounts 
to  one third.  From a theoretical  viewpoint, the idea of 
a  more  neutral  attitude  of the  Fisc  in  respect  of the 
choice between the use of equity capital or loan capital 
is  attractive.  Whether the effect in  a concrete situation 
must  be  considered  as  favourable  or unfavourable  is 
dependent on whether the  total  of  the  factors  which 
determine  the  method  of financing,  prove to  lead to  a 
degree  of  financing  with  loan  capital  which  evokes 
drawbacks. 
53.  Also,  in  this  respect  the fiscal  factor is  only one 
amongst many. Thus there is  a restraining influence on 
the  issuing  of loan  capital  through the fear of charges 
enduring  when  the  profitability  of the  enterprise  de-
creases. Furthermore the return required by the suppliers 
of capital can be higher on loan capital than on the issue 
of shares; for  the  remuneration  of the  investor is  not 
only to be found ia the dividend, but also in the increase 
in  value of the  share by retention of profit. The signif-
icance of that increase in value for the private investor 
is the greater, because as a rule it is not taxed at all, or 
is  taxed at a low rate.  In this respect the issue of con-
vertible debentures is a compromise between the desires 
of demanders  and  suppliers;  seen from  a general eco-
nomic point of view it has its good side in that, from time 
to  time,  in  periods  of high  stock  exchange prices, the 
debts of business decrease, so that there is less danger 
of a constantly accumulating burden of debt. 
54.  The  many  non-fiscal  factors  which  influence  the 
capital  market,  such  as  the  size  and  direction  of the 
supply  by  institutional  investors,  cannot  be  discussed 
here.  However, it may  be  mentioned  that the  gradual 
decrease in  value  of money  will  have opposite effects 
on  the  demand for  and the  supply  of capital.  Fear of 
inflation will have the result that the suppliers of capital 
demand a higher interest on debentures and will  mean 
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that  they  will  prefer  to  invest their money  in  shares. 
On the  other hand,  the possibility of inflation reduces 
the  resistance  in  the  share  company  to  the  incurring 
of debts by the prospect of a decrease of the real burden. 
6.  Unnecessary business expenses 
55.  One of the disadvantages of high  tax rates on in-
come and profit is that there is a tendency of proceeding 
sooner to expenses which are not justified from a purely 
business  point  of view,  but which satisfy the personal 
wishes  of entrepreneurs  (-shareholders).  Examples  of 
this are expensive office fittings, fixtures  and furniture 
and "Bewirtung" of guests of the enterprise (excessive 
entertaining).  The  possibilities  of  deduction  of  such 
expenses  exist  particularly  in  enterprises,  because  the 
tax administration, under the law or in practice, does not 
enter  into  the  conduct  of the  business  and  the  proof 
that business considerations have not been decisive, is 
difficult  to  furnish.  The provisions  of the law  existing 
here and there which  counteract deduction of such ex-
penses, only have a limited significance and present diffi-
culties of implementation. Assuming that these expenses 
in the first place make the retained profit lower, systems B 
and  C  have  the  drawback that, with an equal level of 
tax burden,  they have a higher rate for that profit than 
system A. 
7.  Anti-cyclical application 
56.  The two possible classic uses of the corporation tax 
for  the  mitigation  of  cyclical  disturbances  are  rate 
alterations  and  alterations  in  the  determination of the 
tax base by granting additional depreciation, investment 
allowances, etc. The last mentioned stimuli will work a 
little stronger under the high retention rate of systems B 
and  C  than  under system  A.  Systems  B and C  add a 
third  possibility.  This consists  in  the  alteration of the 
ecart between both rates of system B, and the alteration 
of the size of the credit in system C.  An application in 
system C could fit in the whole of a policy to influence 
private consumption. An application in system B would 
in  the first  instance have an influence on the available 
means of a great part of business. The effect however-
contrary to such instruments as additional depreciations 
and investment allowances-would not extend to enter-
prises of natural persons and, unlike it is the case with 
these  instruments,  not particularly  be aimed at invest-
ments in business assets which are of special importance 
to  the  cyclical  development.  A  serious  drawback  of 
alterations  in  the  rate  ecart  for  anti-cyclical  purposes 
is  in both systems the time lag between the decision of 
the government and the effect on the enterprises and on 
the shareholders. 
57.  The average  dividend  quota is  presumably  in  all 
cyclical  phases  under  the  systems  B  and  C  a  little 
higher than under system A.  The· individual income tax can therefore in  the systems  B and C, in consequence 
of its level and the progression, exercise certain effects 
as "build-in stabilisator". 
Those effects  are,  however, affected  by the mitigation 
for  the avoidance of economic double taxation on dis-
tributed profit.  That mitigation encourages distribution, 
for the very reason that it eliminates for a great part the 
tax effect. If  one assumes that in a period of boom, with 
increasing money incomes, the individual income tax, on 
average due on the dividend, amounts to 40%,  then the 
extra  dividend  (compared  with  the  situation  under 
system A) is not taxed by more than 6 2/3%, i.e., the dif-
ference  between individual  income tax and the amount 
of the  mitigation.  If the  individual  income  tax,  on  an 
average paid on the dividend, is  lower than the amount 
of the mitigation of the economic double taxation, then 
the tax receipts are lower to the extent that the dividend 
quota is higher. In a period of recession opposite effects 
are to  be noticed.  In both situations the differences  in 
this  respect  between the systems are of little  practical 
importance. 
8.  Improvement of the distribution of property 
58.  From a point of view of social policy, an interesting 
question is  whether the systems discussed also differ in 
so far that one system more than the other contributes 
to  an  increase  of the  holding  of shares  by  the  lower 
classes.  In  the  first  instance  one  would  think  that  a 
mitigation  of economic  double  taxation  is  particularly 
of benefit  to  those  who  have  a  low  income  and  who 
therefore  only  have  to  pay  a  small  percentage of the 
return to the Fisc. 
As to this  subject it  is  especially necessary to hold on 
to  a  comparison  between  the  systems  on  the  basis of 
an equal  level  of burden in  the corporate sector.  If the 
introduction  of  systems  B  or  C  means  a  budgetary 
sacrifice,  then,  as  far as no  signs  of shifting occur, an 
increase of the available private income  resulting from 
it accrues to the groups of people with a medium-sized 
or high income; for among the working classes the hold-
ing  of shares  is  practically  non-existent.  The cases  in 
which a low income and the holding of shares go together, 
can partly be explained by inheritance, gifts to children, 
etc.  A  correct comparison of the merits of the systems 
is  only  possible  with  an  equal  level  of burden,  which 
means that opposite to a mitigation of the burden on the 
distributed profit stands an increase of the burden on the 
retained  profit.  Does that  alteration  make  the  holding 
of shares more attractive for people with a low income? 
59.  It must be  emphasized  that not  a  single  effect is 
to  be  expected if the dividend quota remains equal  to 
that  under system  A.  If the  dividend  under the  three 
systems  is  the  same,  then the  result for  the  taxpayer 
with a low income is also the same. More of the dividend 
(in  system C, including the "avoir fiscal") remains after 
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the  imposition  of individual  income  tax,  to  the  extent 
that the taxpayer is  subject to  a  lower progressive tax 
rate, but this is  true of all  three systems. 
60.  If the  dividend  quota  under  systems  B  and  C  is 
higher  than  under  system A-which  may  be  assumed 
(see  sections  37  et  seq.)-then,  if  one  considers  the 
income  disposable  for  spending  or  saving,  the  tax-
payer  with  a  low  income  profits  more  by  it  than  the 
shareholder who  is  subject to a high  progressive scale. 
This applies to all  increases of income. Contrary to this, 
the retained profit of the company is  lower (examples II 
and  Ill).  Retention of profit has-in  general, and  seen 
on a longer term-the tendency to increase the value of 
the  share.  That  increase  of value  is  not  taxed,  or is 
taxed at a proportionate rate, so that the net advantage 
is  independent of the income.  A  higher dividend quota 
seems therefore, in  general, to be more advantageous-
or  less  disadvantageous-for  the  groups  with  a  low 
income than for those with a  high  income.  In the short 
term, an  increase of the dividend  quota does  not need 
to  have  an  influence  on  the  price  of the  shares.  The 
profitability  of the  enterprise  does  not  change  for  the 
time  being  and  for  the  shareholders  with  a  medium-
sized or high income-who  have the greater part of the 
shares in  their hands- an increase of the distributions, 
when  the  profit remains  the  same, will  in  general  give 
no ground for a higher valuation of the share. Should, in 
the  case of an  increase  in  dividend  at the cost of the 
retained profit, the prices rise then the increase of the 
rate of return is  lost to that extent. 
61.  Let  us, notwithstanding the great degree of uncer-
tainty on numerous points, assume that under systems B 
and  C  the  holding  of shares  becomes  more  attractive 
for the "small investor". This can manifest itself in two 
ways.  There can be  a  certain shifting of the holding of 
savings  accounts  and  bonds  in  the  direction  of  the 
holding  of shares  (whereby  the  risk  can  be  spread by 
bying  shares  in  investment  funds).  Here  lie  chances, 
when  money continues to decrease in  value, of a better 
maintenance  of the  real  value  of the  holding.  This  is, 
however,  hardly  a  matter  which  influences  the  distri-
bution  of property.  This influence will  only make itself 
felt if the greater attraction of shares would lead to more 
savings from income. This possibility must be considered 
to be small. 
Even  apart  from  the  fact  that  the  inclination  to  save 
is  determined  to  a  very  considerable  degree  by  other 
factors  than  the  prospect of a  higher income from  the 
return, it  is  not to  be  assumed that a somewhat higher 
return on a small holding of shares will alter the spending 
habits  in  the  case  of a  low  income.  The  continuing 
increase of the real income of the workers, junior office 
employees and  suchlike  will  make little difference.  For 
the  general  increase  of prosperity  evokes  among  the least  prosperous  people  a  strong  urge  to  increased 
consumption. 
62.  Systems B and C  have in  identical cases the same 
definite  tax  consequences.  The  difference  between 
both  systems  is  that  in  system  C  the  small  investor, 
who  has  to  pay  little or no  individual  income tax, only 
after  the  assessment  for  the  individual  income  tax 
receives  the  remaining  net  dividend  amount,  whereas 
in  system  B  the  whole  dividend  is  received  at  once 
from  the  share  company.  If however,  as  is  usual,  an 
advance  levy  in  the  form  of a  dividend  tax  is  added 
to system B, then the same effects are achieved: a delay 
in  the availability of part of the dividend and the avoid-
ance of an "additional collection" of' individual income 
tax. 
9.  Socio-psychological effects 
63.  The  diverging,  mutually  sometimes  opposite 
effects of a certain tax structure, cannot be overviewed 
by  the  taxpayer.  Certain  aspects, however,  sometimes 
stand  out so  distinctly, that they  have an  influence on 
the confidence with  which, however much difference of 
opinion  there  may  be  as  to  the  desirable  distribution 
of the  burden,  still,  in  any  case in  principle,  as  far  as 
possible equal treatment of identical cases is  respected, 
which  includes a not too different treatment of socially 
closely  related  categories  of  cases.  Unequal  fiscal 
treatment,  or  the  suspicion  of  it,  can  evoke  strong 
emotions.  An example of such a judgment of the fiscal 
position  of practically  identical  cases is  the  inclination 
of  the  middle  class  trader  to  compare  the  marginal 
burden of the individual income tax paid by him-which 
restricts  his  possibilities  for  renewal  and  expansion-
with the tax on the retained profit to be paid by the share 
company competing with  him (section 50). 
64.  Differing  opinions  are  held  on  the  question  of 
whether,  in  general,  shareholders  regard  the  double 
burden  of  the  corporation  tax  existing  side-by-side 
with  the  individual  income  tax  on  dividends  as  being 
unjustifiable.  It seems reasonable to assume that share-
holders of private companies feel  this way. To a certain 
extent, the ground for this can be removed by the opening 
of  the  option  mentioned  in  section  50.  The  normal 
investor is  in  a  different situation; he is  not personally 
involved  in  the  imposition  of the  corporation  tax.  He 
compares  the  pros  and  cons  of the  various  forms  of 
investment  which  accrue  to  his  account:  a  savings 
account, life  insurance, bonds, shares and immovables. 
What  prior  burden,  in  the  form  of corporation  tax  or 
other  taxes,  the  yield  from  these  investments  have 
undergone is not known to him as a rule. He will also not 
be  very  interested,  since  the  prior burden has  already 
been  discounted  in  the  expected  profitability  and  the 
development  of  the  value  of  the  investment.  Only 
changes  in  the prior burden during his  holding-which 
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can  happen  in  any  system-are of importance to him. 
The switch  from  a  system containing economic double 
taxation to a system which partly takes away that double 
taxation-or vice  versa-will  be  particularly taken into 
account  by  him  in  connection  with  the  question  of 
whether the value of his  holding is affected.  If the prior 
burden, roughly, remains the same then it  is improbable 
that the alteration of the structure of  the system seriously 
affects his  senses of justice as an investor. 
65.  There can be  some doubt as to the answer to the 
question  of  whether  the  nonshareholder  will  take  a 
similar  view  and  will  find  in  none of the systems dis-
cussed  here  an  infringement  of the  principle  of fiscal 
equality. This is  especially  the case with system C, on 
account of the fact that on the dividend received in cash 
little or no tax need to be paid (or tax is even refunded), 
which can give rise to the thought that there is  a fiscal 
privilege for this form of return on property as opposed 
to  other  forms  of  income.  The  significance  of  this 
psychological factor will  vary according to the national 
fiscal  tradition-e.g.  whether or not the principle "non 
bis  in  idem"  is  established-and the information which 
is  given  to  the  taxpayers  on  the  significance  and  the 
consequences of the system of taxation. 
10. Technical tax points of view 
66.  In  the choice between diverging tax structures the 
technical  tax  points  of view  are  of great  importance. 
A complicated structure can impede the extent to which 
the law  and its  implementation are understandable and 
thus  have  influence  on  the  degree  in  which  taxation, 
as  it  has  been prescribed in  the law,  is  in fact put into 
force.  Drawbacks of that nature can effect the distribu-
tion of burdens aimed at and have consequences for the 
conditions of competition.  Furthermore  they  increase 
the collection costs for the government and the "indirect 
costs'' consisting  of the  costs and the  nuisance which 
the fulfilment of his  obligations implies for the taxpayer 
and  the supervision of that compliance by  the govern-
ment. 
67.  Systems B and C are by their nature more compli-
cated than system A.  They are similar to the last men-
tioned system in as far as· they contain a real corporation 
tax which is also imposed in case of a complete distribu-
tion of the profit. They differ from system A by the fact 
that in  addition they contain a regulation to reduce the 
tax in  the case of distribution of the  profit. That regu-
lation gives rise to complications. The reduction should 
only be granted if this is  in  agreement with the purport 
of the system, viz. if  indeed there is a question of  double 
taxation, and therefore not in cases in which the corpora-
tion  tax  is  not (or  not fully)  imposed,  or no  individual 
income  tax  is  to  be  paid.  The technical elaboration of 
this  point  differs  in  connection with  the difference  in 
the structure of  the systems pointed out in section 23. 68.  In system B the technique of the law and the im-
plementation are entirely in the sphere of  the corporation 
tax and of the tax at source to be retained on dividends 
paid by the share company. The imposition of the indi-
vidual  income  tax is  beside the point.  The application 
of the  lower rate  is  governed  by  the  definition  of the 
concept of distribution entitling to taxation at the lower 
rate  ("beriicksichtigungsfahige  Ausschlittung").  These 
should be excluded from this definition the distributions 
which under the national law, do not give cause for the 
imposition  of individual  income  tax.  In  the  Federal 
German Republic this includes a bonus share distributed 
to shareholders, with  the  exception of the bonus share 
from  the  annual  profit (stock-dividend). 
That  which  falls  under  the  concept  of "berlicksichti-
gungsfahige  Ausschlittung",  can  accrue  to  persons 
other than  natural  persons.  The corrections  necessary 
when dividend accrue to share companies have already 
been  discussed  in  sections  24  et  seq.  If the  dividend 
is  enjoyed by  entities  which  are not liable  to taxation, 
such  as  cultural,  ecclesiastical  and  charitable  institu-
tions and associations, then problems of implementation 
impede retracting the lower rate. 
69.  It should  furthermore  be provided whether a dis-
tribution  of  dividends  from  the  profits  of  previous 
years does or does not entitle to taxation at  the lower 
rate, which is notably of  importance if the share company 
conducts  a  policy  of dividend  equalization.  An  affir-
mative  answer  to  that  question  leads  to  numerous 
complications, such as reopening assessments of  previous 
years.  Exclusion of past profit (and of exempted profit) 
can partly be achieved by a limitation of the privileged 
distributions  to  an  amount  of the  taxed  profit  of the 
last year. Such is the provision in the German law. More 
accurate works a limitation to the after tax profit of the 
last year, i.e.  after deduction of the corporation tax due 
(the "available profit"). Those limitations cannot prevent 
difficulties from arising, if the Jaw provides for a carrying 
back of losses.  In that case,  the  amount  of the taxed 
profit  is  being  reduced  retroactively,  which  leads  to 
an  additional  imposition  of corporation  tax  and  which 
can have an effect on the "Nachsteuer" (section 26). 
In the foregoing, it must also be taken into consideration 
that the profit for tax purposes can differ from the com-
mercial  profit,  which  forms  the  starting  point  for  the 
appropriation of profit by the share company. 
Special  tax  regimes  for  certain  categories  of entities 
may  require  an  adaptation of the provisions mentioned 
above  to  those  regimes.  The  technical  complications 
that  are  to  be found  in  system  B are not  small.  They 
affect,  however,  a  relatively  small  number  of  tax-
payers. 
70.  In system C the moderation of the economic double 
taxation is applied, when the dividend passes the second 
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toll. The connection with the concept of  taxable income-
or taxable profit for share companies-is  thus achieved 
automatically.  If bonus  shares  are  not affected by the 
individual income tax, the full corporation tax continues 
to  burden  them.  There is  also no question of credit if 
the  dividend  is  received  by  entities  which  are  not 
liable to corporation tax, such as cultural, ecclesiastical 
and charitable institutions. 
71.  The dividend can find  its source in  profit which is 
not  taxed  at  all,  or not taxed  at the normal  rate.  The 
legislator can consider this not to be a sufficient reason 
to refuse the normal credit in case of distribution. Such 
is the provision in  Belgium.  With a high  rate of tax the 
drawbacks increase.  The French law  maintains  the re-
quirement  that  the  dividend  must  accrue  from  profit 
taxed at the rate of 50%  (in which case by presumption 
of law  the  dividend  may  be  deemed to accrue first  of 
all  from  the fully  taxed profit).  How far this is the case 
would have to be determined every time when a dividend 
distribution  takes  place,  assuming  that  for  the  share 
company the  assessment  has  been definite.  Dividends 
with  diverging credit rights,  however, would  constitute 
serious  complications,  both  for  the  determination  of 
prices  on  the  stock-exchange  and  for  the  individual 
income tax return for the shareholder. This complication 
can be removed by imposing an additional advance levy 
on  distributions  accruing  from  profit  not  fully  taxed. 
Thus in  France (the country which provided the C rate 
of the examples in sections 19 et seq.).  1/3 of the dividend 
distributed from profit which has remained untaxed has 
to  be  withheld  and  paid  as  a  precompte  to  the  tax 
administration,  i.e.,  50%  of the  2/3  which  the  share-
holder receives  in  hands.  The computation of the indi-
vidual  income  tax  of the  shareholder can  thus always 
proceed  from  an  integral  credit.  Dividends  accruing 
from  participati~n dividends received tax free, fall under 
the  precompte.  However,  as  concerns  participation 
dividends from  French subsidiary companies, the credit 
connected with  it  can be applied against the precompte. 
A further equality when imposing individual income tax 
on dividends can be achieved, as happens in  France, by 
instructing domestic institutions acting as intermediaries 
in  the  payment  of foreign  dividends  to  residents,  to 
withhold  1/3  of the dividend as advance levy ("retenue 
a Ia  source").  The  difficulties  with  the  imposition  of 
the individual income tax are thus reduced. 
Nevertheless, the necessity of"grossing up" the dividend 
(increasing  the  amount  received  by  the  "a  voir  fiscal", 
which  is  equal  to  the credit and  declaring the  total  as 
income)  remains  a  complication,  which  has  the  more 
significance,  because  the  credit  right  must  be  realized 
by  a  great  number of persons  who  have  little  skill  in 
the  field  of accountancy.  That consideration  makes  it 
desirable  not  to  impose  a  dividend  tax  in  addition; 
and  in  this  system  there  is  not  so  much  reason  for  a 
dividend tax. 72.  Furthermore  it  is  for  administrative  reasons 
alone necessary to grant the reduction only if the recent 
profit  is  distributed.  Such  a  restriction  does  not  need 
to go as far as under system B.  A limitation of the credit 
right to dividends from the profit of the last five years-
in  accordance with the French legislation-would seem 
sufficient. 
73.  Additional  considerations  may  furthermore  lead, 
as  is  the  case  in  Germany  and  France,  to  excluding 
distributions  not  provided for  in  the corporate charter 
from the relief. 
III.  International  aspects  of  the  systems  A,  B  and  C 
74.  From  the  structure  of  the  systems  (section  1) 
follows the nature of the consequences which can occur 
in the application to cases with an international element. 
In  system  A  the  taxation  of the  entity  takes  place 
independently  of the  taxation  of the  shareholder.  The 
former  does  not  affect the latter.  Thus the application 
is  domestic  and the same prevails in  the application to 
profits and dividends crossing borders. So in the imposi-
tion  of the corporation tax it does  not  matter whether 
the  shareholders  are  residents or non-residents  and  it 
is of no influence on the taxation of the shareholders-
provided  double  taxation  is  avoided  by  a  unilateral 
measure  or  by  a  tax  treaty-whether  the  profit  from 
which  their  dividend  accrues  is  made  by  a  domestic 
or by a foreign share company. In systems Band C the 
legislator has brought the taxation on the profit and the 
taxation on the dividends in relation with each other, in 
order to  moderate  the  economic  double  taxation.  The 
relief in  one phase finds its reasons in the full  taxation 
in  the other phase.  In system B the corporation tax on 
distributions is reduced in view of the individual income 
tax on the dividends.  In system C the individual income 
tax is  relieved by  considering an  element of the corpo-
ration tax as an advance levy. If  the whole process takes 
place  within  national  territory,  then  the  legislator  has 
in  principle complete control.  If one of the two phases 
takes  place  abroad,  then  the  question  arises  what 
consequences must be attached to it for the other phase. 
75.  In  certain  cases,  as  will  appear  below,  those 
consequences  are  expressed  in  "border adjustments", 
in  impositions or refunds of tax in  respect of dividends 
crossing  borders.  In  the  systems  B and  C  border ad-
justments of that nature cannot be avoided, if one does 
not wish to tax cases involving a foreign element consid-
erably lighter or havier than similar domestic cases  .. 
Border  adjustments  in  respect  of dividends  also  take 
place,  irrespective  of the  tax  structure,  on  account of 
the  international  demarcation  of the  taxing  rights  of 
the countries, but they do not need to accrue from this. 
A  balanced  demarcation  of  the  taxing  rights  of the 
countries, .in  the  way that international double taxation 
23 
on  dividends  is  avoided,  is  possible  without  border 
adjustments.  It has  become usual,  however, as will  be 
discussed  in  the  next  section,  to  grant  to  the  source 
country of the dividends a certain right of taxing. 
In  systems  B  and  C  consequently  several  types  of 
border  adjustments  concur,  a  conjuncture  of  which 
hampers  a clear understanding.  The two  problems can 
indeed  be  theoretically  distinguished  within  these 
systems,  but  they  cannot be  separately regulated. 
76.  The  international  consultation on  the  problem of 
the  avoidance  of international  double  taxation  in  the 
Fiscal  Committee  of the  Organization  for  Economic 
Co-operation  and  Development has  led in  1963  to the 
drawing  up  of the  model  convention.  The  provisions 
laid  down in  it give the most representative expression 
of the concepts in  respect of the demarcation of taxing 
rights at present prevailing in Europe. The OECD model 
convention of 1963 has been recommended by the Coun-
cil of the OECD as a guide in the conclusion of bilateral 
treaties; it  has been accepted by the Member States of 
the European Communities as a basis for the discussions 
on  a  multilateral  convention, and the  same  applies  to 
the  Member States of the  European Free Trade Area. 
The provisions of the OECD model convention give in 
general  a  consistent  solution  of  the  problem  of the 
avoidance  of  international  double  taxation  on  profit 
and  dividends.  The  imperfections,  1)  which  are  to  be 
found on certain points, as well  as the remedies against 
them, stand apart from the tax structure and are there-
fore  not discussed  here.  For each category of income 
the  model  convention  determines  the  limits  to  which 
the  taxation  on the  income  in  the  source country can 
extend. Profit of a share company is taxed in the country 
where the share company is  established, provided that 
the  profit  which  can  be  attributed  to  a  permanent 
establishment in  the other Member-State can be taxed 
by the last mentioned State. The taxation of dividends is 
-unless the shares belong to a permanent establisment 
in  the other State -left to the country of residence of 
the  shareholder, except that a limited imposition in the 
source State can be agreed upon.  Against the unlimited 
imposition  on  profit  and  the  limited  imposition  on 
dividend  in  the  source  State, stands the  obligation of 
the  other State  of granting  an  exemption  or a  credit 
for the tax paid abroad. 
These  provisions  of  the  model  convention·  can  by 
themselves be applied in  the relation between countries 
with  system  A.  For the  conventions  with  or between 
countries with another system a definite solution could, 
1)  Reference is  particularly  made to the  Proposal  by the Council for a 
directive,  concerning  common  taxation  applicable  to  parent corpo-
rations  and  subsidiaries  established  in  different  Member  States 
submitted  by  the European Commission to the Council (15  January 
1969). in  1963,  still  not be found, so that a further study of the 
Fiscal  Committee  of  the  OECD  has  been  decided 
upon.  That study has not yet been completed. 
77.  In the expositions following hereafter, in order not 
to complicate the argument, attention will  not be drawn 
every  time  to  the  possibility  of an imposition on  divi-
dends in  one country and a credit in  the other country. 
In  a  number  of cases,  however,  such  an  imposition 
plays  a  part in  the effects of the systems and attention 
should be drawn to that element. 
System A 
78.  As  can  be  seen  from  the  above,  the  drawing  up 
of rules  for  the application of system  A in accordance 
with its purport to cases with an international element, 
gives  rise to little difficulties.  In the system itself, as it 
has  been  described  in  section  7  4,  demarcation  of the 
taxing  rights  has  been  already  provided  for.  In  the 
avoidance of international double taxation, the practice 
of the treaty, in accordance with the OECD convention, 
is  based on the principle of reciprocity. The provisions 
of the  model  convention stand apart from  the  level  of 
the  corporation  tax  and  of the  level  of the  individual 
income  tax in  the countries from  which  the income is 
coming and to  which  it flows.  This independence from 
national  alterations  in  the  tax  rates  gives  durability 
to the  treaties based on those provisions and is  advan-
tageous to the uniformity of the treaty law. 
Reference table for systems B and C 
79.  In  the  following  considerations  the  various  cate-
gories  of cases in  which  one or more foreign  elements 
occur should be  carefully distinguished. 
In view  of this  the  table  below  has  been  included,  to 
which  reference is  made  each time  that this  should be 
necessary for the sake of clarity. 
The following  elements  of a  foreign  nature determine 
the classification of the table: 
the  profit  has  been  made  abroad  (Table  under  II) 
the  share  company  is  established  abroad  (Table 
under I (2) and I I (2) 
the shareholder is a non-resident (Table under I (1) b; 
I (2) b and II (1) b). 
In order to provide a better survey the cases have also 
been  included  in  which  a  foreign  element  is  lacking 
(Table under I  (I) a).  The cases in  which the domestic 
element  is  entirely  lacking  have  not  been  included, 
because then there is  no point for taxation to be based 
upon. 
Among the shareholders, the parent companies of con-
cerns occupy a special place for tax purposes. The share-
holders, therefore, are each time distinguished as being: 
a.  parent, companies,  i.~  .•  share  companies  which  on 
account of unilateral  provisions  or by  treaty  enjoy 
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exemption from corporation tax for the dividends on 
the participation in the subsidiary company ("Schach-
telprivileg"),  in  respect  of the  size  of their holding 
of shares in other companies (subsidiary companies), 
or have a right to indirect credit (see section 90); 
b.  investors,  i.e.,  the  other  shareholders,  natural 
persons  or share  companies  which  with  respect  to 
the dividends are liable to  the individual income tax 
or the corporation tax on the same terms as for other 
income (apart from the credit for possible withholding 
taxes). 
Naturally a  share company can be  liable to taxation in 
more  than  one  capacity  and  fall  under more  than one 
regime.  Complicated situations, such as  the attribution 
of dividends to the profit of a permanent establishment, 
have been left aside. 
I. Domestic profit 
(1)  made  by  a  domestic  share company, of which  the  shares 
are in  the hands of: 
a. I.  a domestic parent company 
a.2.  resident investors 
b. I.  a parent company abroad 
b.2.  non-resident investors 
(chapter I I) 
(chapter I I) 
(2)  made  by  a  permanent  establishment  of a  share company 
abroad, of which the shares are in  the hands of: 
a. I.  a domestic parent company 
a.2.  resident investors 
b. I.  a parent company abroad 
b.2.  non-resident investors 
II. Foreign profit 
(I) made  by  a  permanent  establishment  of a  domestic  share 
company, of which the shares are in  the hands of: 
a. I.  a domestic parent company 
a.2.  resident investors 
b. I.  a parent company abroad 
b.2.  non-resident investors 
(2)  made by a share company abroad, of which the shares are 
in the hands of: 
a. I.  a domestic parent company 
a.2.  resident investors 
System B 
80.  Before proceeding to an examination of the various 
categories of cases, it is desirable to make a few general 
remarks  on  the  nature  of system  B and  on  the  stand-
point which can arise from that nature in respect of the 
extension  of the  reduction  of the  corporation  tax  to 
distributions  from  foreign  profit  and  to  distributions 
to non-residents. 
81.  It is characteristic of system B that the moderation 
of  the  economic  double  taxation  on  dividends  takes 
place in  the sphere of the corporation tax. 
As  far  as  the  corporation tax  affects  domestic  profit, 
there is no problem: distribution is followed by reduction. Is there also a reason for the reduction of  the corporation 
tax  when  there  is  a  distribution  of profit  of foreign 
origin? 
An  affirmative  answer  is  quite  natural, if the  profit of 
foreign origin is liable without restriction to the domestic 
corporation tax. This answer can also be given, if credit 
against  tax  is  granted  for  the foreign  tax,  and also  if 
that  credit,  in  respect  of  dividends  from  subsidiary 
companies, extends to an  indirect credit for the corpo-
ration tax abroad. 
But  what  must  be  the  answer,  if the foreign  income, 
unilaterally or by treaty, is  exempted from the domestic 
corporation tax? Is there sufficient reason for the granting 
of the reduction if profit is distributed which is  affected 
by corporation tax abroad? 
The  nature  of  system  B  produces  arguments  for  a 
negative  answer.  If returns abroad are exempted from 
corporation tax, they cannot qualify for the moderation 
of that tax.  A fiscal rule of that kind should form a part 
of the  tax  regime  of the  country  which  as  the  source 
country is  entitled to tax the profit.  A reduction of the 
corporation tax finds  indeed a  natural  limitation in  the 
amount of that tax, and the reduction fitting to the system 
could  not  even be  fully  effectuated if the profit of the 
domestic  share  company  mainly  consists  of exempted 
dividends  from  subsidiary  companies,  as  can  be  the 
case  with  parent companies  of international  concerns. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  point  of  view  that  the 
phase  of  the  corporation  tax  has  been  terminated 
with  the  imposition  abroad,  also  entails  that  the 
fact that (exempted) foreign participation dividends are 
not passed on to the parent's own shareholders does not 
give  rise  to  the  imposition of N achsteuer in  the hands 
of the domestic parent company. This is  also the provi-
sion in  the German legislation. 
82.  Still,  also  if  the  negative  standpoint  is  taken  in 
respect of distributions accruing from exempted foreign 
profit,  an  increase of the  reduction  of the corporation 
tax  can  in  fact  occur  by  the  presence  of that  profit. 
The presence of that profit will  mostly be expressed in 
the  size  of the  distributions.  If the  distributions  are 
proportionally  attributed  to  the  profit  elements,  the 
reduction  will  not increase. This will  be different if the 
law provides that the dividend is  considered in the first 
place to accrue from the taxed profit.  Such a presump-
tion  of law, that in fact the reduction is  also applicable 
to part of the distributed foreign profit, exists in the Fed-
eral  German  Republic.  An  analogous  rule  in  respect 
of the credit right in system C exists in France. 
The effects of the  priority  regulation  described here in 
the  application  of the  distributions  are  not  prevented, 
but indeed they are somewhat limited, if the stipulation 
is  made  that  the  amount  of the  privileged  dividends 
cannot  exceed  the  "available  profit",  i.e.,  the  taxable 
profit decreased by the corporation tax (see section 69). 
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83.  A  second  characteristic  feature  of system  B  is 
that the relief is already granted with the distribution by 
the share company, without waiting to see if the dividend 
is taxed (again) (see section 23). 
If  a country employing system B does not take measures 
which withdraw the reduction of the corporation tax in 
the case where the dividend is enjoyed by non-residents, 
these automatically also benefit from the moderation of 
the economic double taxation. 
The question  of whether for  that country there is  oc-
casion  to  take  such  "compensating"  measures,  can be 
answered  differently  according  to  the  view  which  is 
adopted  as  to  the  mitigation  of the  economic  double 
taxation. Both a narrow and a broad conception are pos-
sible.  In  the  narrow conception  the  purport attributed 
to  system  B is  only to  moderate the economic double 
taxation if not only the corporation tax, but also the other 
component of the imposition, viz. individual income tax-
or in share company with just a few shares: corporation 
tax-belongs to the own tax system. In that conception 
the  reduction  of the corporation tax is  a  correction of 
the  total  domestic  tax burden on distributed corporate 
profits which are considered to be too high, and there is 
no reason for such a correction as far as the shareholders 
live or are established abroad and consequently a com-
ponent of the imposition belongs to a foreign tax system. 
84.  There  are,  however,  impediments  to  this  narrow 
conception in  the imposition of the corporation tax.  A 
limitation  of the  reduction  of the  corporation  tax  on 
account  of the  presence  of non-resident  shareholders 
would  not  only  affect  the  non-resident  shareholders, 
but all  shareholders and this to the same extent. To the 
share  company  the  burden  of the  corporation  tax  is 
an  indivisible  factor.  Furthermore  the  share company 
would be taxed more heavily-by enjoying less reduction 
-because  its  capital  is  entirely  or  partly  in  foreign 
hands,  wl]ich  can be considered to be in  contravention 
of the  standpoint  embodied  in  the  non-discrimination 
clause  of article  24,  paragraph 5,  of the  OECD model 
convention  of  19631)  and  in  corresponding  provisions 
in  bilateral  treaties.  Should the country with  system B 
"take back" the reduction of the corporation tax in case 
of the holding of shares by non-residents, by measures 
which  do  not  affect  the  distributing  share  company 
itself, e.g.  by  the imposition of a dividend tax on divi-
dends flowing abroad, which has the object of compen-
sating entirely or partly for the reduction of the corpora-
1
)  "Enterprises of a  Contracting  State, the capital  of which  is  wholly 
or partly owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by one or more 
residents of the other Contracting State, shall not be subjected in  the 
first-mentioned  Contracting State to any taxation or any requirement 
connected therewith which is other or more burdensome than the taxa-
tion  and  connected  requirements  to which  other similar enterprises 
of that  first-mentioned  State  are  or  may  be  subjected."  (For non-
discrimination in respect of permanent establishments, see section 93). tion tax-and which is defended on that account in nego-
tiations on a tax treaty-then this would, in the letter of 
the agreement, not be in contravention ofthe clause of  the 
OECD convention mentioned, but it would be difficult to 
reconcile with  its  intent.  Those who  prefer the narrow 
application of the reduction will  also not follow the dif-
ficult, from a technical and juridical point of view, road 
of first  granting  and  then  taking  back  the  reduction. 
The  French form  of system C  (section  104)  achieves 
in  a  more  simple  way  the  effect  desired  in  that  con-
ception. 
85.  Therefore, the  broad conception  which  maintains 
that the presence of non-resident shareholders in  itself 
does  not  impede  the  granting  of the reduction fits  in 
system  B.  Here,  however,  the  reservation  should  be 
made  that  the  broad  conception  should  not  lead  to 
consequences which mean a deviation from the purpose 
and the contents ofthe system, as this applied in domestic 
relations.  The  requirement  of non-discrimination  may 
be  considered  not  to  oblige  the  acceptance  of such 
consequences.  Domestically,  reduction  of the  corpo-
ration  tax  is  only  granted  if the  requirement has  been 
satisfied that it can be established that the profit has left 
the share company and, if received by a parent company, 
it has been passed on by that company to investors. The 
establishment of the fact that the profit has left the share 
company  causes  difficulties  in  the  case  of domestic 
establishments of a non-resident company (see sections 
93-94).  The establishment that the profit has left a con-
cern causes  difficulties  with  domestic  subsidiary  com-
panies  of non-resident  concerns  (see  seetions  88-92). 
The danger existing in  the last mentioned case that an 
excessive distribution of profit will  be decided upon for 
fiscal reasons, can also present itself in a share company 
which  is  controlled  by  a  non-resident  majority  share-
holder (-natural person) (section 87). 
A  non-resident, natural person or share com-
pany, owns just a few shares in a share company 
established in the country employing system B. 
86.  In these cases, in  general, a  second phase of tax-
ation  takes  place  in  the  country  of the  shareholder. 
The  broad  conception,  which  lets  the  non-resident 
shareholder share in  the relief of the economic double 
taxation, as a rule therefore does not present difficulties 
when compared with the position of the resident share-
holder. Therefore there is no reason for special compen-
sating  impositions.  These certainly cannot rest on the 
argument  that the country  employing  system  B,  in  its 
capacity of source country, indeed  imposes  very little 
tax on the profit, when it limits itself to the low rate of 
tax  on  distribution,  increased  by  the  dividend  tax  of 
15%  usual  in  treaties.  This  argument  of a  budgetary 
nature-which only affects the shareholders if the other 
country  refuses  to  credit a  possible  additional imposi-
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tion-it  not  convincing,  because  with  an equal  burden 
of the corporation tax the difference between system B 
and  system  A  is  such  that under  system  B the distri-
butions  are  more  lightly  taxed,  but  in  contrast to  that 
the  retained  profit  is  more  heavily  taxed  than  under 
system A. 
A  non-resident  natural  person  is  majority-
shareholder  in  a  domestic  share  company 
87.  In  this  case the shareholder can influence the dis-
tribution  policy  of the  share  company  in  such  a  way 
that  maximum  advantage  is  taken  of the  low  rate  of 
tax on distribution of system B.  He will  be able to pro-
ceed to  this  with  fiscal  advantage if he  is  a resident of 
a  country  which  taxes  income  in  general  or  foreign 
dividends  in  particular at  very  low  rates  or not at all. 
The relief of burden  which  thus  can be  achieved also 
depends  on  the  dividend  tax  in  one  country  and  the 
credit of it in the other country. In such cases the ques-
tion can be raised whether system B, in which the rates 
of the corporation tax and those of the individual income 
tax have been adjusted to each other, does not become 
disordered in  its effects.  The consequences will  be  the 
more  noticeable,  if  the  shareholder  provides  for  the 
financing  of the  enterprise  by  bringing  in  again  in  the 
form of capital the means withdrawn. To the budgetary 
loss for the country in which the enterprise is established 
are  added  then  drawbacks  in  respect  of the  unequal 
competition  position.  As  a  remedy  against  such a use 
of the  system  one could  think  of a  supervision of the 
degree  of distribution,  by  means  of similar  processes 
as  are  sometimes  applied  in  the  opposite  situation, 
viz.  against  private  share  companies  which,  for  the 
avoidance  of the  imposition  of individual  income  tax, 
do not proceed to a distribution of.profit. 
Experience shows that it  is  difficult to apply standards 
in  order to  be able to judge what extent of distribution 
is  reasonable  and  that  there  can be  good  reasons  for 
unusual conduct.  One could also think of an additional 
imposition  in  the  form  of the  maintenance  of a  high 
dividend  tax  in  the relations with  the countries whose 
tax system is  the cause of the drawbacks. Such a regu-
lation, however, would have a very blunt effect, because 
it  would  also  apply  to  normal  distributions and in  the 
case  of small  shareholders.  Besides,  differentiation  in 
the dividend tax increases the chance oftax avoidance by 
following  a detour which is fiscally cheaper. 
A  share  company  abroad  has  a  participation 
in  a  share company of the country which ap-
plies system B 
(parent  company-subsidiary  company  relation). 
88.  In the country of the parent company the "Schach-
telprivileg"  can  apply  to the  dividends  on the  partici-
pation.  No obligation of distribution is  connected with the  "Schachtelprivileg".  Judged  from  the  ratio  of the 
system, the relief surpasses its  purpose as  to that part 
of the dividend which is  retained by the parent company 
abroad and thus remains at the disposal of the concern. 
Should it concern a domestic parent company, a "N  ach-
steuer"  would follow.  If, however, the parent company 
has distributed the dividend received to its shareholders, 
and  if  these  are  investors,  then  the  relief  has  been 
granted  rightly.  It  cannot  be  expected  that  the  other 
country is  prepared to co-operate in obtaining verifiable 
data  as  to  the  extent to  which  the  dividend  from  the 
subsidiary company may be considered to have contrib-
uted  to  the  dividend  of the  parent  company,  and  to 
what extent the dividend has been received by investors. 
In order to restrict the difference in burden as compared 
with the domestic cases of self financing, a compensating 
imposition  will  be  desirable  which,  without  any  dis-
tinction,  is  applied  to  all  outgoing  participation  divi-
dends. The size of such a compensating imposition will 
have  to  be  smaller than that of the "Nachsteuer", but 
it will  only be able to be determined "a forfaif'. Inherent 
in  this  is  a  great  degree  of approximation;  it  is  only 
certain  that  it  must  amount  to  a  considerable  part of 
the  ecart  between  the  rates.  In  the  Federal  German 
Republic  the rate of the "Kapitalertragsteuer" amounts 
to  25%,  at  a  rate-ecart  of 36%.  This dividend tax lies 
on the correct level if the concern does not pass on to 
the  investors  approximately  70%  of the dividend from 
the  subsidiary  company.  This  percentage  is  higher 
than the normal retention quota of the total profit after 
taxation  of international  concerns.  On the other hand 
there may be cases analogous to those described in the 
previous  section.  Concerns  abroad-behind  which 
domestic interests can also lie-have the opportunity to 
gain  fiscal  advantage  by  distributing  more  than  would 
be the case on the basis of other policy considerations, 
and  then to  transfer the  moneys  received  in  the form 
of capital to the subsidiary company.  Furthermore the 
country  which  applies  system  B  will  have  to  try  by 
treaty negotiations to  maintain as much as possible its 
own tax on participation dividends, as it functions as a 
partial "Nachsteuer". It will have to try to press forward 
that demand which is  counter to the usual treaty regu-
lations  for  participation dividends,  and  it  will  have  to 
defend  the  point  that its  system,  chosen for  domestic 
reasons, justifies a deviation from the principle of reci-
procity. In general this will best succeed within the frame-
work of an exchange of concessions. 
89.  On the part of negotiation partners which apply the 
"Schachtelprivileg"  the  most  understanding  may  be 
expected, because, by the very recognition of a "Schach-
telprivileg"  for  participation  dividends  abroad,  they 
show  that  they consider the  phase  of the  corporation 
tax as a matter of the country of the subsidiary company. 
Naturally the agreed "Nachsteuer" does not come into 
consideration for  a  credit in  the  country of the parent 
company. 
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90.  Less understanding can be expected from negotia-
tion  partners  which  apply  the  system of credit against 
tax.  In the parent company the dividends  are taxed as 
profit, with credit for foreign dividend tax and, if indirect 
credit  is  also  granted,  for  the  foreign  corporation  tax 
which is  attributable to the dividend. Assuming that the 
level of the corporation tax does not deviate much from 
the level of the tax on retained profit in  the country of 
the  subsidiary  company, the  drawbacks  of a  too  light 
burden mentioned above do not, or practically do not, 
exist.- (This  is  the  more  so,  if the  negotiation  partner 
also applies system B and therefore imposes heavier tax 
to  the  extent  that the  parent company passes  on less 
dividend to its  shareholders; such a country, however, 
will  keep  in  mind  the negotiations  with  third parties). 
On account of  these considerations the "credit countries" 
will  mostly  be  inclined  to  hold  on to reciprocal appli-
cation of the usually low treaty percentages for the tax 
on  outgoing  dividends.  The most  striking  case is  here 
again  (compare  section  87)  the  use  of the  withdrawn 
dividends for the financing of the enterprise in the coun-
try applying system B.  For that case a special provision 
has  been included  in  the German-American tax treaty 
which permits the maintenance of the German dividend 
tax at 25%  if in  the year of distribution in the Federal 
German Republic more than 7 1/2% of the dividend has 
been brought in again in  the share company. The appli-
cation  remains  restricted  to  the  amount  of the  sum 
brought in,  as far as it is covered by the dividend in the 
year  preceding  that  when  the  amount  is  brought  in, 
and  in  the  two  following  years  (article  6,  section 5 of 
the treaty, as amended in  1965). 
91.  A  further  drawback of the  additional  taxation on 
outgoing participation dividends in  the form of a higher 
dividend  tax  is  that in  the  matter of the participation 
concept it  makes the differences particularly striking. A 
splitting up of a shareholding, by apportionment to two 
or more companies belonging to the concern in  such a 
manner  tpat  the  treaty  limit  for  participations  is  no 
longer reached, but still that in the country of the parent 
company,  makes  it  possible  to  avoid  the  additional 
taxation  of  the  country  with  system  B,  without  the 
exemption in the other country lost. 
92.  If distributions  not  provided  for  in  the  corporate 
charter do  not fall  under the low distribution rate, such 
as is the case in the Federal German Republic, and then 
also  at  home  do  not  give  cause for  the  imposition  of 
"Nachsteuer" in  the  hands  of a  parent company, they 
should,  if  accruing  to  a  parent company  abroad,  also 
not  be  considered  for  a  "Nachsteuer" in  the form  of 
a  higher dividend  tax.  A  distribution  not provided for 
in  the corporate charter can, for example, take place if 
the tax on the profit of the subsidiary company is based 
on  a  deviation from  the  price  which  had  been  agreed 
upon between  the  subsidiary  company  and  the  parent 
company.  For  these  cases  an  exception  will  have  to be  included  with  the  same contents as that which  has 
been laid down in  the Final protocol to article 6,  para-
graph 11, of the German-Swiss tax treaty. 
A  permanent  establishment  in  the  country 
applying system B of a foreign share company 
93.  Also  in  the  case of transfer abroad of the  profit, 
the profit remains in the same enterprise. No more than 
with  participation  dividends  can  the  application  of 
system  B  proceed according  to  plan.  Part of the facts 
relevant  to  that  application-viz.  the  extent  to  which 
the profit of the permanent establishment can be consid-
ered to have been distributed otherwise than to a parent 
company-is  hidden  from  the  observation  of the  tax 
authorities  in  the  country  applying  system B.  Again  a 
rough solution "a forfait" is the only way out. The Ger-
man  legislation  excluded  the  profit  of  a  permanent 
establishment  of a  foreign  enterprise from  the  double 
rate. The tax rate for the whole profit has been fixed at 
49%,  i.e.  2%  lower than the rate for retained profit of 
share  companies  established  in  the  Federal  German 
Republic. The presence of profit destined to be  distrib-
uted in the other country, and to be taxed in the hands of 
the shareholder, is  always taken into account to a small 
extent, even if the profit in fact  serves the  purpose of 
self-financing;  but on the other hand, also in  that case 
only to a very small extent, if the profit for a greater part 
flows  to  the  shareholders.  Fiscal neutrality  in  respect 
of the legal form of the enterprise cannot be spoken of. 
In the Dutch draft bill of 1960 (see  section~  2)  no moder-
ation at all of the high rate had even been provided for 
in this case. This omission certainly does not seem to be 
compatible  with  the  non-discrimination  provision  laid 
down  in  article  22,  paragraph  4 of the  OECD model 
convention1)  and in many bilateral tax treaties. 
"Indirect taxes" 
94.  Both in the case of the participation dividends and 
in  the  case  of  permanent  establishments,  resident 
investors  can  find  themselves  among  these  finally 
entitled to the profit of the enterprise abroad. Through 
international mergers these cases will increase in number 
and  in  significance.  In  the  narrow conception (section 
83)  there  is  then  also  an  economic  double  taxation, 
viz. a conjunction of the burden of the domestic corpora-
tion  tax  and of the domestic individual income tax.  A 
moderation of that burden for the resident shareholders 
which  goes  further  than the agreed  settlement,  in  the 
manner of section 88  and  section  93,  is,  however, for 
the reasons mentioned above, not to be realized. In the 
French  legislation  also  the  "indirect"  resident  share-
holders  are  not  entitled  to  a  credit;  the credit is  only 
1)  "All  other elements  of capital  of a  resident of a  Contracting  State 
shall be taxable only in that State". 
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applicable  to  those  distributions  to  French  residents 
which  are  made  by  share  companies  established  in 
France. 
95.  The conclusion  from  the foregoing  considerations 
is  that' system  B,  because of its  starting point of relief 
being given already at the point of the imposition of the 
corporation tax, proves to be a rigid system, if it must be 
applied to cases with an international element. Practical 
considerations,  and  sometimes  also  juridical  points  of 
view,  prescribe the course to  be followed.  The conclu-
sions  which  have  been reached in  the items  discussed 
agree  with  the  form  which  system  B  has  obtained in 
the  Federal  German  Republic. 
An  important  principle  is  that  the  economic  double 
taxation is only moderated when the profit taxed within 
the country is  distributed,  except for the mitigation by 
the  presumption  of law  mentioned  in  section  82;  and 
furthermore  that both resident and non-resident share-
holders  share  in  the  mitigation.  The application of the 
mitigation  therefore  extends  to  all  cases  mentioned 
under heading I of the Table (section 79). 
These  principles  can  be  realized  in  accordance  with 
the  application  at  home  in  respect  of  non-resident 
investors (natural persons or entities) who own just a few 
shares in domestic  share companies.  For the rest such 
a  realization,  for  numerous  reasons,  is  not,  or only in 
an imperfect way, possible: 
the  taxation  of  domestic  share  companies  which 
are  subsidiary  companies  of  a  company  abroad, 
must  be  supplemented "a  forfait"  by  a  tax on  out-
going  dividends,  which  cannot  be  adapted  to  the 
circumstances  of  the  individual  case,  which  are 
relevant in accordance with the purport of the system; 
the incorporation in a tax treaty of such an additional 
imposition  on  participation  dividends,  if necessary 
deviating from the principle of reciprocity, meets with 
resistance,  notably  on  the  part  of those  countries 
which  do  not have a "Schachtelprivileg" for foreign 
participation dividends and which apply the method 
of credit against tax in  order to  avoid international 
double  taxation on participation dividends. 
The  tax  regime  in  these  two  categories  of cases 
stimulates  investment  in  the  country  applying 
system  B.  The withdrawal  of the profit,  necessary 
for the sake of the fiscal advantage, can be followed 
by reimportation of the funds  in the form of capital. 
These stimuli emanating from  the system are partic-
ularly  effective  when the dividend in  the country to 
which  it  flows  is  taxed  at  low  rate,  or has  been 
exempted as  a participation dividend. 
By  the  establishment  of  holding  companies  and 
similar structures, the interested party can contribute 
to the. creation of such a situation. differences  between  the  participation  concept, 
unilaterally  or by  virtue  of a  treaty in  force  in  the 
country applying system B, on the one hand, and the 
participation  concept  which  is  applied  unilaterally 
by some other country, on the other hand, can lead to 
outgoing dividends being exempt from the additional 
imposition, even though they have been exempted in 
the other country as participation dividends; 
in  respect of domestic  permanent establishments of 
companies abroad, the application of the double rate 
must  be  renounced  and  an  agreed  uniform  rate  be 
accepted, which does not allow for the appropriation 
of  the  profit  in  the  individual  case.  This  regime 
differs from that for subsidiary companies of compa-
nies  abroad.  System  B  is  therefore  not  neutral  in 
respect of the legal form for investments from abroad; 
a  non-resident who controls a  domestic  share com-
pany and  who in  his  home country pays little or no 
individual  income  tax  on  the  dividends,  can,  by 
maximum  distribution  of  the  profit,  enjoy  more 
fiscal  advantage  than  is  in  accordance  with  the 
purport of the system. This stimulates tax flight. 
System C 
96.  In system C the mitigation to reduce the economic 
double  taxation  on  dividends  is  only  granted  if  the 
dividend  is  taxed (again)  (section  23).  The taxation in 
the  first  phase,  on  the  profit  of the  share  company, 
happens  uniformly.  That phase  therefore is  not  preju-
diced  with  regard  to  the  application  to  cases  with 
an  international  element.  Consequently  there  are  in 
system  C  more  possibilities  in  respect  of that  appli-
cation than in  system B.  The postulates which control 
the choice between the possibilities can be expressed in 
the  most  simple  way  in  the  regime  for  investment 
dividends: 
C I:  Equality  for  resident  and  non-resident investors. 
The  mitigation  to  reduce  the  economic  double 
taxation  is  not only granted to resident investors 
in  domestic  shares,  but  also  to  non-resident 
investors in  domestic shares. 
C II. Equality  for  investments  at  home  and  abroad. 
The  mitigation  to  resident  investors  is  not  only 
given in  respect of dividends on domestic shares, 
but also in respect of dividends on foreign shares. 
C III. Rejection of mitigation for  cases with an interna-
tional  element.  The  relief accrues  exclusively  to 
resident  investors  in  respect  of dividends  from 
domestic enterprises. 
The regime  for  investment  shares  in  characteristic for 
the three variants of system C, and, therefore, hereafter 
the three cases are discussed as variants of that regime. 
That denomination, however, is  not quite exact, as will 
appear in  the discussion of the rules fitting  to each of 
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them for the other categories of cases, such as partici-
pation dividends and profit of permanent establishments. 
C I. Equality  for  resident  and  non-resident 
investors 
97.  If,  in  the  application of system C  to international 
cases,  the  starting-point  is  accepted  that  the  relief to 
mitigate  the  economic  double  taxation  on  dividends 
should  also  benefit  non-resident  investors,  then  the 
country employing system C  should refund part of the 
tax  which  it  has  imposed  as  the  source  country.  The 
refund to non-resident investors will have to correspond 
to  the  credit  which  in  the  case  of resident  investors 
is granted against the individual income tax due by them. 
This  starting-point is  in  accordance with  that which in 
the  discussion  of system  B has  been  indicated  as  the 
broad conception. 
98.  Better than is  the case in  system B it can be guar-
anteed that the dividend, on which the relief is granted, 
is  actually  subject  to  a  (second)  taxation in  the home 
country  of the  investor.  For  the  refund  to  the  non-
resident  investor  the  condition  can  in  fact  be  made 
that a certificate of his home country is  submitted. This 
contributes  to  the  equality  of treatment  of the  non-
resident  investor  and  the  resident  investor,  who  only 
enjoys  the  credit if tax is  imposed on him.  Also, if the 
other country is  prepared to co-operate, the refund can 
be effected by credit against the tax in the home country, 
be  it  naturally  for  account  of the  country  employing 
system C. 
99.  With the figures for the rate and the credit chosen 
in  chapter II, which are the same as those which now 
exist  in  France,  the  refund  amounts  to  50%  of the 
dividend  declared  by  the  share  company.  It does  not 
matter  if  the  country  employing  system  C I  levies  a 
pn:!compte  (section  71)  on  the  dividend  paid  from 
untaxed profit.  Should this be the case, then the refund 
correctly also cancels the precompte. 
The refund can be reduced by the dividend tax imposed 
unilateralty  or reduced  by  virtue  of the treaty on out-
going dividends. With a withholding rate of 15% on out-
going dividends in the source country, the refund would 
be 27 1/2% of the dividend: 
dividend  100 
"a  voir fiscal" (=credit)  50 
dividend tax 15% of 150 is 22.5  150 
refund 50- 22.5 = 27.5 
In his home country, if this country credits the dividend 
tax of 22.5 imposed by the country employing system C, 
the  non-resident  shareholder  will  have  to  declare  a 
dividend  of 150.  This  dividend  amount is  the  same as 
that  which  has  to  be  declared  by  the  resident  share-
holder in his home country. 100.  No more than in system B can the broad concep-
tion  be  accepted in  system C I without the reservation 
that  consequences,  which  constitute  a  deviation  from 
the purport and the contents of the system as it is applied 
at home,  have  to  be  prevented. This reservation leads 
also  in  system  C  to  special  regulations  for  categories 
of interested parties other than investors. Thus a refund 
corresponding  to  the  domestic  credit  would  not  be 
correct,  if the  shareholder of the  domestic  share com-
pany, is  a foreign parent company.  In this case it is  not 
certain that the dividend received is  passed on and that 
a second round of taxation follows. Just as in  system 8, 
as  has  been described before, the equality of treatment 
of  domestic  and  foreign  cases  can  only  be  realized 
globally.  Also in the system C I discussed here, there is 
no other solution than a refund "a forfait" of part of the 
apparent corporation tax, an approximate method which 
does not exclude a fiscal  advantage of foreign concerns 
as  compared  with  domestic enterprises.  An imposition 
of 25%  "Kapitalertragsteuer"  under system  8  (section 
88)  would  run  parallel  to  a  refund  under  system  C, 
equal to  12 1/2% of the dividend.  Also in  respect of the 
domestic  permanent  establishments  of foreign  enter-
prises, no other solution can be thought of than the one 
described  in  system  B,  viz.  a  simple  reduction  of the 
rate  of the  corporation  tax  (section  93).  With  such  a 
lower  rate for  permanent establishments,  the  claim  to 
a  refund has been settled.  There is  no rule for indirect 
interests (section 94). 
101.  As is apparent from the above, this way of  treating 
the  cases  with  an  international  element  means  that 
system C  is  bent towards  system B,  as  this  is  applied 
in  the  Federal  German  Republic.  The  problems  and 
considerations  which  are determinative for the  choice 
each time of the most acceptable regulation, are essen-
tially the same as those which came up in the discussion 
of system B. For a number of those which, for brevity's 
sake,  have  not  been  repeated  here,  reference  is 
made  to  what  was  said  earlier,  which  mutatis  mutan-
dis  is  applicable  to  this  variant  of system  C.  From 
a  technical  point  of view,  however,  the  two  systems 
continue  to  differ.  In  system  B  part  of the  corpo-
ration  tax  is  cancelled  at once,  whilst  in  system C  a 
refund  of credit  is  necessary.  Only  in  respect of the 
taxation of domestic permanent establishments of  foreign 
enterprises  are  the  systems  B  and  C  also  technically 
equivalent. 
C II.  Equality for domestic and foreign shares 
102.  This variant of system C  fundamentally deviates 
from  the  previous  one.  It implies  that with  respect to 
dividends  received by residents in the second phase of 
taxation the same reduction of economic double taxation 
is  applicable,  irrespective of whether the dividends are 
of domestic  or of foreign  origin.  That reduction is  ex-
pressed irf a  lower taxation of dividends, reflected in  a 
credit, than of other forms of income. The reason is  to 
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be found  in  the previous phase of taxation at the level 
of  the  share  company  which  made  the  profit.  The 
startingpoint entails that it is  of no importance whether 
the  share  company  is  established  at home  or abroad. 
Neither  does  it  matter  whether  the  corporation  tax 
imposed  has  been the  domestic  or a  foreign  tax.  The 
country with  system C II moderates its taxation as the 
home country of the shareholder and not, as in the pre-
vious  'variant,  as  source  country  of the  profit  of the 
share company. 
With the equalization of the foreign corporation tax, as 
the reason for granting a mitigation in the second phase 
of taxation, with the domestic corporation tax, matches 
an  equalization in  the first  phase.  This means that the 
domestic corporation tax is  fully  maintained in respect 
of non-resident  shareholders  and  in  respect  of profit 
from  a  domestic  permanent establishment of a foreign 
enterprise. The cases of domestic profit (Table section 79 
under I)  do  not produce problems in  this respect, even 
though they contain an international element. 
The corporation tax is  entirely, in the domestic and the 
foreign  sphere,  a  real  corporation  tax,  corresponding 
to type A.  Here also lies the explanation why system 8, 
in  which  the  corporation  tax  at  once  decreases  when 
profit  is  distributed,  cannot  be  extended  in  this  way 
to cases with an international element. 
103.  In system C II the problems are to be found in its 
application  to  the  income  accruing from  foreign  profit 
(Table section 79  under II). Just as at home, the whole 
profit  of share  companies  is  not  taxed  abroad.  In  the 
domestic  sphere  this  fact  can  already  be  a  reason  to 
connect  the  credit  only  to  distributions  from  profit 
which  has  been  taxed  according to the normal  rate of 
the  domestic  corporation  tax  (section  71).  If the  first 
phase of taxation takes place abroad, there is  the more 
reason not to grant the credit unJ:il  the nature and size 
of taxation in that phase have been examined. Naturally 
there  will  be  many  cases  in  which  there  will  be  no 
difficulty;  the  profit  of  industrial  and  commercial 
enterprises  will  mostly  have  been  subject  to  normal 
taxation.  Foreign  dividends,  however,  can  also accrue 
from  untaxed,  or unusually  low  taxed profit,  although, 
judged by domestic standards, they would not be entitled 
to such a regime. This situation in  a certain way forms 
the counterpart of the one discussed in  section 87.  The 
attachment  of a  credit  to  dividends  from  such  profit 
would  disturb  the  proper  functioning  of the  system. 
Flight from  taxation can be  the consequence.  Interest, 
royalties, etc. can be transformed abroad into dividends 
which would be entitled to the regime for dividends. 
For a judgment of the taxation which  has  taken place 
abroad  sometimes-as  is  the  case  with  international 
concerns  and  international  investment  companies,  in 
many parts of the world-the necessary data are lacking, 
both  to  the  tax  administration  and  to  the  investor. 
The  variant  C II  can  therefore  not  be  applied  in  an 
acceptable way. C III.  No moderation of economic double taxa-
tion in cases with an international element 
104.  In  the  French  legislation  neither  the  trend  of 
thought discussed under  I nor that discussed under I I, 
has  been  followed.  The  right  to  the  credit  has  been 
exclusively connected to:  dividends accruing from profit 
taxed in  France (section 105), provided that they accrue 
to  a  French resident (natural person or share company 
(section  106),  and  are  distributed  by  a  share company 
established in France (section 107) ). 
105.  The  first  restriction  excludes  distributions  from 
foreign  profit from  the  moderation of economic double 
taxation.  This applies  both to  profit made by a foreign 
permanent establishment of a domestic  share company 
(Table  section  79  under  II  (1))  and  to  participation 
dividends  received  by  a domestic  share company from 
its  foreign  subsidiary  company  (Table  under  I I (2) ). 
Both  categories  of income  are  not  taxed  in  the  hands 
of the domestic share company; the  French "impot sur 
les  societes"  follows  the  principle  of territoriality  and 
includes in the profit "uniquement des benefices realises 
dans  les  entreprises  exploitees  en  France", be  it  that 
there  is  a  possibility  to  opt for  taxation  according  to 
"world-wide profit". 
The question of the relation between foreign  profit and 
the moderation of economic double taxation has already 
been  discussed  with  respect to  system  B (section 81). 
There  it  appeared  that,  if foreign  profit  is  exempted, 
there is  good  reason  not to connect to the distribution 
a  right  to  moderation of the  domestic tax.  The taking 
of that stand-point on the other hand, as was mentioned 
there,  entails  that  in  system  B in  the case of non-dis-
tribution of the profit the "N  achsteuer" is not imposed. 
The phase of the corporation tax is  completed with the 
imposition  abroad.  The same  idea,  transferred into the 
structure and terms of system C, means  there that the 
foreign  profit  not only  remains exempted in  the  hands 
of the  French share company from  the first half of the 
French corporation tax  (the  "real"  25%),  but can also 
remain  exempted  from  the  second,  creditable  part  of 
the  French  corporation  tax.  Only  if dividend  must be 
considered  to  accrue  from  foreign  profit,  must  the 
share  company  retain  the  "pre compte",  which  to  the 
resident  shareholder,  in  his  capacity  as  a  taxpayer,  is 
no  more  than  an  advance  levy.  The imposition of the 
"pre compte",  however,  may  not  take  place, ·in  conse-
quence of the legal presumption mentioned in sections 71 
and 82. 
106.  The second restriction concerns the persons who 
are  entitled  to  a  credit.  Non-resident shareholders are 
not so entitled, so that the moderation is  not applicable 
to the categories of cases mentioned in the Table under 
I (l)b.  For them, therefore, the French system is  equal 
to a system of the  type A, in  the sense, however, that 
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the rate is  higher than would be necessary for the same 
tax receipt, if it would also be of type A at home. Should, 
however,  the  dividends  be  considered  to  accrue  from 
profit which  is  not subject to the full  rate of the corpo-
ration  tax,  then  the  "precompte"  of  33 1/3%  of  the 
dividend must be paid on that dividend. The "pre compte" 
is  the  result  of considerations  of imposition technique 
and  has,  in  the  domestic  sphere,  no  material  conse-
quences.  If  there  are,  however,  non-resident  share-
holders, then it becomes a definite charge for the share 
company, against which for the non-resident shareholders 
no  right to a credit exists. To demonstrate this the fol-
lowing  comparison  is  given  of two  share  companies, 
one  with  exclusively  resident  shareholders  and  the 
other  with  exclusively  non-resident  shareholders, 
which both distribute the same dividend from  the same 
exempted  foreign  profit.  The  share  company  with 
resident  shareholders  can cover the "precompte" from 
the  amount destined for  payment of dividend.  Its self-
financing is not affected by it.  Also its "dividend image" 
does not suffer from it, because for the shareholder the 
dividend is  supplemented by the right to a credit which 
stands  against  the  payment  of the  "precompte".  The 
share  company  with  non-resident  shareholders  on  the 
contrary, must choose between a really lower dividend 
or  reduced  self-financing,  as  a  direct  consequence  of 
the  additional  tax  imposed  on  it  in  the  form  of the 
"pre compte".  The question therefore arises  of whether 
in  the  sense  of article  24,  paragraph  5,  of the OECD 
model convention (section 84),  it does not bear a "taxa-
tion  other  or  more  burdensome"  than  that  to  which 
the first share company is subject. 
107.  The third restriction concerns the place of estab-
lishment of the distributing share company. The restric-
tion  has  the  consequence  that the  right  to  a  credit is 
not  attached  to  distributions  accruing  from  profit  of 
permanent  establishment  of foreign  share  companies 
taxed in  France (Table under I (2) ), even if the dividend 
accrues to residents. 
108.  The variant of system C existing in France there-
fore  restricts  the  moderation  of  economic  double 
taxa'tion  on  dividends  to  the  strictly  domestic  cases 
(Table under I (l)a). If it concerns foreign  profit, or if 
the  beneficiary  of the  dividend is  a  non-resident, or if 
the  distributing  share  company  is  not  established  in 
France, the  French  system  resembles a system of the 
type A.  This statement is  naturally only valid from the 
fiscal-technical  point  of view  and  does  not  apply  if 
account is  taken of such aspects as equality of competi-
tion,  choice  of the place of establishment, etc. 
In  certain  cases  a  possibly  imposed  "precompte"  is 
indeed  refunded  to  non-residents.  In accordance  with 
the Franco-Swiss tax treaty the "precompte" is refunded 
to  Swiss  interested  parties.  By  virtue  of a  unilateral 
administrative measure refund is also made to residents of other countries with  which  France has concluded a 
treaty  for  the  avoidance  of double  taxation.  In  those 
cases  the  additional  taxation  described  in  section  I  06 
is also waived. 
109.  Under the  French legislation  no  dividend  tax is 
imposed  as  far  as  the  domestic  cases  are concerned. 
There is  no  need for  that, since the functions  which  a 
dividend  tax can have in  the domestic  sphere are per-
formed  by  the  creditable  part  of the  corporation  tax. 
This creditable part amounts to  25  points on a "gross-
dividend" (after deduction of 25  points of real corpora-
tion  tax)  of 75  and  means  therefore  an  advance  levy 
of 331/3%. 
According  to  the  purport  and  content  of the  French 
legislation, the corporation tax is fully a real corporation 
tax  in  respect of non-residents.  On outgoing dividends 
(and on the profit of permanent establishment of foreign 
share  companies,  section  115  quinquies  Code  General 
des  lmpots)  a  dividend  tax  of 25%  must  be  withheld. 
Owing  to  this,  the  non-resident  receives  in  his  hands 
half of that which the resident declares as dividend. 
French  non-resident 
shareholder  shareholder 
dividend  50  50 
avoir fiscal  +25  -
dividend tax  - -12.5 
75  37.5 
Should  the  shareholder be entitled  to  a  credit  against 
tax for  the  French dividend  tax  in  his  home  country, 
then  the  dividend  to  be  declared  as  income  increases 
to 50. 
110.  In  conventions  concluded  by  France  during 
recent  years,  the  dividend  tax  on  dividends  accruing 
to investors  has  been reduced to  15%  on the basis of 
reciprocity. Apart from the cases where the dividend is 
concealed  in  the  home  country,  the  reduction  of the 
percentage  only  has  significance  for the  investor who 
was already entitled to a credit if he has a low income, to 
the others the obtaining of a right to credit in the home 
country is of importance. Refund of part of the French 
corporation tax has, however, never been agreed upon. 
The discrimination against  n~m-residents in  comparison 
with  residents,  in  consequence  of the  absence  of the 
credit,  has  therefore, also  under treaty positions, fully 
remained  to  exist.  The French position of negotiation 
does not have the weak spot which can impede the nego-
tiations  for  a  country  with  system  B (see section 89); 
the negotiations can therefore have the usual character 
of an exchange of concessions where it concerns imposi-
tions in the source country on a basis of reciprocity. 
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1  I I.  From a  point of view  of the international  move-
ment  of capital  and  the  relations  between  the  stock 
exchanges  strong  discriminatory  effects  emanate from 
the  French  legislation.  The exclusion  of foreign  profit 
and  of foreign  shares  stimulates investment of French 
capital  in  France.  The exclusion  of non-residents  is  a 
disincentive  to  investment  in  France by  non-residents 
in the form of share capital (whereby, sometimes, substi-
tution  by  the  granting of loans can occur, in  as far as 
legal  provisions  do  not  form  an  impediment).  The 
system therefore leads also to a certain isolation of the 
national  capital  market.  The price of French shares, if 
the  system  is  effective,  will  mainly  be  determined  by 
the  supply  and  demand  of French  residents.  To non-
residents  which  receive  a  smaller  net  return  after 
taxation  than  residents,  the  purchase  at  the  French 
prices will  not  be  attractive.  Only speculators who are 
out for capital gains will be an exception. 
I 12.  From the foregoing considerations it appears that, 
in  principle,  system  C  is  suitable  for  diverging  appli-
cations with regard to cases with an international element. 
The uniform  imposition in  the first  phase on the profit 
of the share company allows freedom in  the answering 
of the  question of whether and, if so, how for interna-
tional cases the economic double taxation will be moder-
ated. Three variants have been examined. 
C I.  Equality  for  resident  and  non-resident  investors 
in domestic shares. 
The  necessary  complements  to  be  added  to  the 
system  make  it  materially  come  near system  B, 
as this is applied in the Federal  German Republic. 
The conclusions of section 95 are mutatis mutandis 
applicable. 
C II. Equality  for  domestic  investments  and  foreign 
investments of residents. 
If sufficient data on the first phase of taxation are 
lacking,  this  variant  cannot  be  applied  in  an 
acceptable way. 
C III. Rejection  of  the  moderation  for  cases  with  an 
international  element.  This form,  which  is  that of 
the  French  legislation,  has  a  strongly  autarchic 
tendency. 
IV.  Other systems 
a.  Complete  avoidance  of  economic  double 
taxation  of  dividends 
113.  Economic  double  taxation  is  entirely  avoided 
if only  one  tax  is  finally  imposed  on  the  profit which 
is distributed to the shareholders. In modern tax systems 
which  contain  a  synthetic  individual  income  tax, that 
single  tax  on  dividends  will  be  the  individual  income 
tax  which  makes  allowance  for  the  capacity  of the 
shareholders to pay tax.  This result can be achieved in two  ways:  either by  not imposing  the  corporation tax 
on the  distributed  profit,  or by  considering the corpo-
ration  tax  on the  distributed  profit  entirely  as  an  ad-
vance levy. 
The first  method is  the extreme form  of system B.  The 
rate of distribution is nil, only the retained profit is taxed. 
This system exists in Greece. 
In  the  second  method,  the  corporation  tax  affects 
the whole profit, but the tax imposed on profit that has 
been  distributed is  fully  credited against  the individual 
income tax to which the shareholder is subject in respect 
of the  grossed-up  dividend.  Any  excess  is  "refunded" 
to  the shareholder. This system is  the extreme form of 
system C. In this form it existed until 1937 in the United 
Kingdom  and it  still  exists in  Ireland. This system has 
been proposed by  the Canadian  Royal Commission on 
Taxation  (Carter-Commission)  in  its  report  of  1967; 
the  proposal  has  not  been  adopted  by  the  Canadian 
Government. Furthermore it is to be found in the advice 
of  the  "Wissenschaftliche  Beirat"  to  the  "Bundes-
ministerium  der  Finanzen"  of  the  Federal  German 
Republic,  mentioned  in  article 2. 
ll4.  From  the  discussion  in  the  chapters  II  and  III 
of the  effects  of the  systems  which  contain  a  partial 
avoidance  of economic  double  taxation  on  dividends, 
the direction of the consequences of a complete avoid-
ance  can be derived.  On account of the fact  that with 
an equal level of burden the rate of the corporation tax 
will  surpass that in  systems B and C (and naturally still 
more that of system A)  the "tax quota" (section 33)  on 
retained profit will be higher. The "tax quota" on distri-
buted profit, on the contrary, is nil. The effects emanating 
from  that will  be of the same nature as in  system B, or 
respectively  (if the  Irish form  is  chosen) in  system C, 
but  they  will  make  themselves  felt  more  strongly. 
There  is  less  reason  for  a  separate  discussion  of the 
merits and drawbacks which can be the consequence of 
those effects, because, in  view of the increasing impor-
tance of modern large-scale business in the form of the 
public  share  company,  it  is  not  to  be  assumed that in 
future the imposition of a "real corporation tax" (section 
5)  on the distributed profit  will  be  renounced. 
b.  Fiscal transparency 
115.  In addition, the complete avoidance of economic 
double  taxation  on  dividends,  as  this  is  realized  by 
Greece and  Ireland in  diverging  ways, will  not lead to 
the  share  company  being  materially  eliminated  as  a 
tax subject.  Whereas it  is  true that the corporation tax 
is  indeed  not  imposed  or is  cancelled  if the  profit  is 
distributed, it  continues to  be  imposed  on the  retained 
profit.  The  burden  on  that  profit  deviates  from  that 
which  matches  with  the  income  of the  shareholders. 
The full  consequence of the identification of the share 
company  with  its  shareholders  is  only  taken,  if  the 
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non-distributed part of the profit of the share company is 
accrued, pro rata parte, to the present shareholders, and 
is  taxed  in  their  hands  as  income.  The integration  of 
corporation tax and individual income tax in this system, 
unlike  in  the  previous  system,  extends  also  to the  re-
tained profit. 
116.  This  approach  has  been  mentioned  incidentally 
in  section 49,  because it  has  a certain attraction as  an 
option  possibility  for  private  share  companies.  For 
numerous  reasons  it  can  be  desirable  or inevitable  to 
conduct  the  enterprise  in  the  corporate form,  even if 
on account of that the fiscal  burden increases. Making 
"fiscal transparency" possible-under guarantees against 
abuse,  e.g.  by  making  it  compulsory  to  abide  by the 
choice made during a certain period, can lead to a more 
reasonable system of taxation. Such an option right can, 
to a certain extent, contribute to the justification of the 
imposition  of a  real corporation tax being less contro-
versial.  If one  can  elect  for  imposition  of individual 
income tax only, it  may  be assumed with more reason 
that, if no use is made of that possibility, in any case for 
the  majority-shareholders the existence of an-whether 
of not mitigated-"economic double taxation", does not 
mean  an  extra  burden,  compared  with  the  individual 
income tax on their share in the total profit. It should, 
however,  be  realized  that  the  fiscal  position  of the 
shareholders can differ widely. This can lead to conflicts 
of interests,  which  are  intensified by  the necessity for 
the  shareholders  individually  to  dispose  of sufficient 
money for the payment of tax. 
This  option  possibility  is  occasionally  to  be found  in 
the  legislation.  Furthermore  the  method  has  been 
mentioned  as  optional  possibility  by  the  Canadian 
Royal Commission on Taxation. 
117.  In  literature  one also  sometimes  finds  a  recom-
mendation  for  the  general  application  of the  system 
discussed here.  In order to avoid the obvious objection, 
that the shareholders cannot be  expected to be able to 
pay tax on amounts they have not received, an advance 
levy  on  the  share  company  in  the form  of  a  "profit 
beneficiary"  tax  is  envisaged.  The  notification  to  the 
shareholders of the profit amount attributed to a share 
also mentions the tax credit which is to be set off against 
the  individual  income  tax.  If the  tax  credit  exceeds 
the individual income tax, then the difference is refunded. 
118.  As  main  argument for  this  system  which  is  put 
forward is  that it replaces the proportional corporation 
tax by the individual income tax adapted to the capacity 
of the  shareholder  to  pay  tax.  The holding  of shares 
becomes  thus  more  attractive  for  the  small  saver. 
"Growth shares" on which little is distributed will  lose 
their special attraction for wealthy people. The advocates 
believe,  that  more  favourable  conditions  arise  for  an 
improvement in  the distribution of property.  A certain extension  of  the-at  present  still  relatively  small-
group of shareowners and within this group a somewhat 
more  equal  distribution  of property  would  be  encour-
aged. 
119.  The  idea  discussed  here  evokes  numerous  ob-
jections  which  explain  why  its  practical  application 
has not been realized. It means a return to the conception 
of the  nineteenth  century-at  that  time  very  compre-
hensible-that  the  public  share  company  does  not  re-
present anything else but a joint enterprise of the share-
holders.  In this  conception  the share company has  no 
existence  of its  own.  The profit  retained by  the  share 
company is considered to be part of the current income 
of the shareholder, which he voluntarily decided to leave 
at the disposal of the share company. 
120.  This  viewpoint  is  clearly  contrary  to  reality. 
The shareholder is taxed under the individual income tax 
for  an  amount  when  it  is  uncertain  whether  at  some 
time  or another he  will  enjoy it,  either as  dividend or 
as capital gain.  Shares change hands frequently and the 
prices  at  which  they  are  sold  and  purchased  do  not 
run  parallel  with  the  size  of the  retention of profit  by 
the share company.  Both  with  respect to general price 
fluctuations and of special price fluctuations of a certain 
share it can be  said  that they are irregular and unfore-
seeable.  Even  if  a  price  fluctuation  is  "regular"  and 
foreseeable  anomalies can occur.  If favourable  profita-
bility  prospects  for  the  coming  year  make  the  price 
of a  share go  up,  the advantage in  case of transfer of 
ownership  somewhere  about  the  date  of the  balance 
sheet falls to the old owner and the tax due (and the credit 
for a possible "profit-beneficiary" tax) to the new owner. 
On  the  other  hand  distributions  from  earlier  profits 
remain  untaxed  for  the  shareholder  of the  moment, 
although  they are income for him  according to current 
conceptions.  A  policy  of dividend  equalization has  no 
significance anymore for taxation purposes. 
121.  The  drawbacks  of  implementation  are  consid-
erable. In the systems A, B (lnd C, the imposition of the 
individual  income  tax,  apart  from  special  cases,  is 
independent  of the  difficulties  in  the  computation  of 
profit  and  of the  taxation  of the  share company.  The 
imposition  of the  individual  income  tax  on  the  share-
holder takes place according to a fixed  datum, i.e.  the 
dividend  distributed.  In the system discussed here, on 
the contrary, all  complications that are met with in  the 
share  company,  are  expressed  in  the  income  of the 
shareholder  to  be  declared  and  in  the  taxation  of it. 
The size of allowable depreciation and the stock valua-
tion  have  a  direct  influence on the amount to  be  paid 
by  the  shareholder.  In  its  turn,  the  share  company 
owning  sl}ares,  must  include  in  its  profit  the  profit, 
pro rata parte, of enterprises in  which it  owns  shares. 
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Also  subsidiary  companies  belong  to  them,  for  the 
"Schachtelprivileg"  does  not fit  in  this  conception.  All 
these data must  be  known  to  the  real  party interested, 
i.e.  the  investor,  if he  is  to  be  in  a  position  to  make 
a  return  and  carry  on  legal  proceedings  concerning 
his assessment.  If the investor has  a share in an invest-
ment company with a dispersed share portfolio, then the 
number  of  data  which  are  of  importance  still  more 
considerably increases. Because in disputes on the profit 
of share companies a final decision is often only reached 
after  several  years,  and  such  a  decision  makes  itself 
felt  via the  holding  of shares of investment companies 
and  other share  companies, just as  a  stone  in  a pond 
causes  ripples  until  these  reach  the  far-off  corners, 
the  assessments in  the  individual  income tax  of share-
holders will, also after years and years, again and again, 
in one direction or the other, be subject to alteration. 
122.  In cases with  a foreign element the system is  not 
applicable.  Non-resident  shareholders  will  in  their 
home country, only  have  to  pay individual  income tax 
(or  corporation  tax)  on  the  dividend.  The  "profit-
beneficiary"  tax  will  be for  them  a  corporation tax,  in 
as far as it affects the retained profit and for  the rest it 
will be a dividend tax. Resident holders of  foreign shares, 
in  the  absence  of data  about  the  profit attributable to 
the  share,  can  only  be  taxed  for  the  dividend.  For 
dividends  from  foreign  participations  the  "Schachtel-
privileg"  will  be  able  to  remain  in  force,  or indirect 
credit against  tax  can  be  granted.  The data in  respect 
thereto have  to  be  passed on by  the share company to 
the final  investor, in  order that this investor, in  making 
his  return,  can  make  allowance  for  the  exemption, 
respectively for  the foreign  tax to be  credited. 
c.  Deduction  of  primary  d'ividend 
123.  As  one of the  suitable  methods  to  moderate the 
"economic double taxation" on dividends, there is  also 
mentioned  the deduction of primary dividend  in  deter-
mining the taxable profit. The basic idea of this method, 
however, is of an economic nature and proceeds from the 
desirability of leaving untaxed a primary interest on the 
equity capital. The usual commercial and fiscal concept 
of profit comprises  more  than  the profit  in  a business-
economic sense. It  comprises also an elementoffinancing 
expenses, consisting of the interest on the equity capital 
used in the enterprise. Only the surplus profit exceeding 
that interest, is  a  "rent" in  the sense that infringement 
of it-also if in  the conduct of an  anti-cyclical  policy 
the rate would be increased strongly-can be considered 
to present no danger for the continuity of the production. 
That rent could be  approximated roughly-in  any case 
in times when there is no inflation-by reducing the profit 
by  the interest which the equity capital, when invested 
in debentures, would have produced. The  conception  of the  share  company  and  its  share-
holders  is  here  different  from  that of the two  systems 
discussed  before.  There  the  shareholder  are  seen  as 
partners jointly carrying on their business.  In  the con-
ception  presently  discussed,  the  shareholders  are  first 
of all  lenders to  the share company, even though  they 
are also entitled to  that part of the  surplus profit after 
taxation which the share company can distribute. 
124.  The  advocates  of this  method  draw  still  other 
conclusions  from  their  analysis  of  the  fiscal  profit 
concept. They point out that just that part of the corpora-
tion tax that falls on the cost element of the interest on the 
equity capital will  be shifted, in contrast to the corpora-
tion tax weighing on the rent part of the profit. The de-
duction will  also contribute to fiscal neutrality in respect 
of the financing with equity or with loan capital and with 
regard  to the treatment of highly  capitalized industries 
on the one hand and industries requiring a great labour 
force on the other hand.  Thus can also be expressed as 
follows:  the  ordinary  form  of corporation  tax,  which 
affects  the  full  profit,  really  consists  of a  tax  on  the 
(surplus-)  profit,  together with  a tax which,  because it 
taxes a percentage of the capital, may be considered as 
a net worth tax (a tax of 50% on 6%  of the net worth is 
equivalent to a net worth tax of 3% ).  The deduction of 
a  primary interest removes this  net worth tax element. 
The system is  a counterpart of the thought defended in 
modern economic literature, implying that the use of the 
factors  of production-capital  and  labour-should  be 
charged,  in  order to  stimulate their more efficient use. 
125.  The  realization  of  the  idea  outlined  in  the 
previous  sections,  meets,  however,  with  serious  ob-
jections which compel the renunciation of the deduction 
of primary interest and the acceptance of the deduction 
of a fixed dividend percentage. An annual determination 
of the actual  net worth-including hidden reserves-of 
all  share companies would be a difficult task, the more 
so, now that the financial interest involved is much more 
considerable than this is the case with the net worth tax 
on  entities  as  this  presently  exists  in  some  countries. 
The  correct  interest  percentage  of the  deduction  can 
only  be  approximated.  Furthermore  the  deduction 
of interest would miss the mark if the amount deducted 
is  not  distributed;  for  then  the  interest on the  equity 
capital  would  remain untaxed, whereas the interest on 
loan capital is  taxed in  the hands of the creditor. 
These  two  methods  tend  to  lead  to  the  result  that, 
abandoning basic business economic thought,  as  a rule 
a  deduction  is  defended  which  is  equal  to  the  lowest 
of the two following amounts: 
a.  a certain percentage of the paid-up capital (or, if one 
wishes  to  avoid  the  complications  of premium and 
informal  capital  brought  in,  a  certain percentage of 
the nominal paid-up capital); 
b.  the amount of the distributed dividend. 
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In this form a deduction of primary dividend is  applied 
in  the legislation of a few  countries, but only as a tem-
porarily  stimulating  measure  restricted  to  new  issues 
of capital. Thus in  Belgium, by way of exception to the 
general  regime,  the  dividends  from  capital  brought in 
during the years 1967-1969 in the form of money-with 
the  exclusion  of  the  cases  of  absorptions,  mergers, 
etc.-have been exempted to a maximum of 5%. 
The system shows furthermore a superficial resemblance 
to  the  system  of the  Italian  "imposta sulle  societa". 
This, however, is a complement to the schedular system 
and does not establish a connection between distribution 
and corporation tax. 
126.  The restriction mentioned under a.  means that the 
open  and  hidden  reserves  do  not  contribute  to  the 
deduction, even if the profit attributable to this part of 
the  capital  is  distributed  (which  can  appear  from  a 
dividend  percentage  which  surpasses  considerably  the 
rate of interest on the capital market). In consequence 
thereof,  the fiscal  effect can vary strongly, also in  the 
case of an equal dividend quota. On this point the system 
differs in its effects from system B. 
127.  If  the capital is increased, the deduction increases. 
The system  stimulates  therefore  the conversion of re-
serves  into  formal  capital.  The tax regime  in  the case 
of distribution  of bonus  shares  is,  in  this  system,  of 
great importance. If  these shares when they are received 
are  not taxed, or if a  mild  regime is  applied when the 
capital of the  share company is  increased, then a  hol-
lowing out of the corporation tax is to be expected. In 
the public share company the necessity of a reduction of 
the nominal dividend percentage can still be a psycholog-
ical  impediment  for  some  time;  in  the  private  share 
company such a drawback does not exist. The hollowing 
out of the corporation tax will  for the rest, as  long as 
the increased capital does  not exceed the really appro-
priated capital, be in accordance with the basic principle 
of the system. 
128.  Under this system the corporation tax will partic-
ularly  continue  to  weigh  on  enterprises  with  a  high 
profitability,  which  do not dispose of reserves capable 
of  incorporation  in  the  capital.  These  consequences 
entail-except perhaps if the percentage of  the deduction, 
contrary to the basic principle, would be put very low-
if this  system is  compared with  systems  A, B and C, 
that the supposition of an equal burden in the corporate 
sector cannot be maintained.  A  compensating increase 
of the rate of the corporation tax will  still intensify the 
tendency to capital-increase. From this tax, at any rate 
for the time being, no sufficient budgetary compensation 
will therefore be achieved. This will, just as in the system 
of fiscal  transparency,  have  to  be  sought for  in  other 
sectors. 129.  The restriction mentioned in  section  125 under b, 
means, that a share company which has to pass the divi-
dend,  is  not  entitled  to  a  deduction.  The  denial  of a 
deduction,  in  these  cases  forced  by  necessity,  can  be 
moderated  by  considering  in  the  application  of  the 
system the primary dividend as "cumulative preferential 
dividend".  This  removes  the  drawback,  provided  that 
in  later  years  sufficient  profit  can  be  made  against 
which the denied deduction can be recovered. 
130.  Can an  increase of the  total  of distributed  divi-
dends  be expected from the introduction of the system 
of deduction  of a  primary  dividend?  If one  assumes, 
with  the advocates  of this  system,  that it  is  precisely 
the tax on the primary dividend which is  shifted, intro-
duction of the system will  ultimately, via the price and 
market  mechanism,  lead  to.  reduction  of  the  profit 
before  taxation.  Under that assumption an increase of 
the dividend quota, which overcompensates the tendency 
to dividend reduction as a consequence of the decrease 
of the profit, does not seem likely. A stimulus to increase 
of dividends occurs in those cases where the limit of the 
exempted  dividend  would  not  be  reached.  Of more 
importance, however, can be  the cases in  which it will 
be endeavoured to reduce the burden of the corporation 
tax  in  the  coming  years  by  retention  of the  surplus 
profit, followed by conversion of the retained profit into 
capital.  No prediction can be  made as  to whether the 
system will  have an influence in favour of more holding 
of shares among the groups of people with a moderate or 
low income. 
131.  The  system  leads  to  difficult  problems  for  divi-
dends  and  profits  crossing  borders.  The  problems 
resemble  those  of system  B.  If the  shares  of a  share 
company are in the hands of a foreign parent company, it 
is  uncertain whether the dividend left untaxed remains 
within the concern or not. 
Also in the presently discussed system a "N  achsteuer" is 
necessary, and here also it can only try to achieve more 
equality  in  treatment  in  an  "a  forfait"  manne'r.  The 
"Nachsteuer", however, cannot, as in  system B,  be put 
at  a  fixed  percentage  of the  dividend,  for  the  extent 
of mitigation  which  a  distribution  has  enjoyed  varies 
according to the level  of the dividend percentage.  The 
"extra dividend tax" will have to be determined for each 
case separately. It will be necessary to include clauses in 
tax treaties which give scope for that. The roughness of 
the  correction  will,  however,  inevitably  surpass  that 
which must be accepted in system B.  It is therefore not 
to  be  expected that treaty  partners  will  agree  to  one-
sided  authority  to  impose  an  extra  dividend  tax  of, 
say, two-thirds of the rate of the corporation tax, which 
indeed for dividends from  profit that has remained fully 
untaxed,  which  perhaps in  the parent company abroad 
are not going to be distributed, can be considered to be 
a  suitable  "forfait".  Even  such  a  high  "Nachsteuer" 
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would  not  prevent  the  pos1t10n  that  a  foreign  parent 
company, in  case of complete retention of the profit-
possibly  followed  by  re-investment  in  the  subsidiary 
company-would enjoy a considerable fiscal  advantage, 
compared with domestic enterprises. Also the taxation of 
domestic permanent establishments of  foreign companies 
will  have to be done "a forfait''. 
132.  Non-resident  owners  of  domestic  capital  will 
place this capital with a domestic share company which 
is  sufficiently  capitalized for  the corporation tax to  be 
reduced  to  nil.  This  possibility  and  its  direct  conse-
quences would encourage again the flight  from taxation 
of domestic  entrepreneurs  and  owners of immovables. 
133.  The other categories  of the  cases with  an  inter-
national element discussed in  B,  viz.  domestic interests 
in  foreign  enterprises,  also  produce  serious  difficulties 
under the system of deduction of primary dividend. The 
nature  of such  difficulties  appear  from  the  above.  It 
should only be indicated that the making of a connection 
between  the  corporation  tax  and  the  nominal  capital 
compels,  if  for  foreign  profit  elements  exemptions 
exist,  to  an  attribution  of the  capital  to  the  domestic 
section  of  the  business  and  to  the  business  sections 
abroad. 
d.  Conclusion 
134.  In  each  of the  three  systems  discussed,  serious 
drawbacks  present  themselves;  These  sometimes 
concern  the  basic  principle  of the  system  which-as 
has been stated in section 5-does not fit in with the real 
contents of the forms of  organisation of present industrial 
life.  Notably this is  the case in the system of complete 
avoidance  of economic  double  taxation  and  to  a  still 
greater extent in  the  system of the fiscal  transparency 
of the  share  company.  In  the  system of deduction  of 
a  primary  dividend,  the  question  particularly  arises of 
whether it  will  prove to  be possible-assuming that the 
system  is  generally  in  force  and  not  only  for certain 
issues-to  keep  the  application  within  the  proper 
limits.  The drawback of complexity is to be found in all 
three systems. This is  least true for the system of com-
plete  avoidance  of economic  double  taxation.  On the 
other  hand,  it  can  be  said  without  reserve  that  the 
general  application  of the  system  of the  fiscal  trans-
parency, is  excluded.  The application to cases  with an 
international element produces in the system of  complete 
avoidance  of economic  double  taxation  objections  of 
a  similar  nature  as in  system  B and C, but intensified 
in  proportion to the big  difference in  the tax regime for 
distributed  and  non-distributed  profit.  In  the  system 
of deduction  of a  primary  dividend  additional  compli-
cations occur. The system of the fiscal  transparency of 
the share company is not to be applied in the international 
sphere. 135.  None of the  three  systems  is  eligible  for accept-
ance  as  a  harmonized system in  the  Member-States of 
the  European  Communities,  because  in  none  of  the 
Member-States, nor in  the  United  Kingdom,  is  the tax 
structure based on one of the three systems, the question 
is only raised during fhe period of transition to a harmon-
ized  system  if the  existing  restricted,  whether  or not 
temporary,  application  of those  systems  can  be  con-
tinued. 
In  the following  chapter the systems just discussed are 
left aside. 
V.  Systems  A,  8  and C and the Common Market 
136.  The international aspects of systems A, B and C, 
discussed  in  chapter  I I I,  are  of  importance  for  the 
relations  between  the  national  economies  in  general. 
The way in which those consequences are evaluated and 
sought after at in a country, is dependent on the national 
objectives and the complete set of circumstances under 
which  endeavour  must  be  made  to  realize  those  ob-
jectives. 
137.  The  countries  of  the  European  Communities 
occupy a  special  position,  owing  to  the fact  that they 
have  accepted  common  objectives.  This  obliges  them 
to  test  their  policy  against  those  objectives.  As  re-
gards  the  good  functioning  of the  Common  Market, it 
is  of importance what influence the various tax system 
have on the  movement of capital between the  Member 
States  and  on  the  development  and  the  integration  of 
the  stock markets.  This point  concerns the elimination 
of all  factors-distortions or discriminations-by which 
abnormal  movements  of  capital  can  be  caused  and 
barriers between the capital markets can be maintained.1) 
It must be  held  in  mind  that, as  has been remarked in 
respect  of these  problems  in  the  Memorandum  of the 
Commission  of  the  European  Communities  to  the 
Council,2)  the  fiscal  factor  increases  in  significance 
in  consequence of the growing economic integration of 
the Member States and the removal of the impediments 
to economic relations between them. 
An  important  step  on  the  road  to  the  removal  of an 
undesired  influence  of fiscal  factors  would  have  been 
taken if,  as  a harmonized system, a tax structure would 
be  accepted  which  makes  it  possible  to  treat  invest-
ments  which  cross  the  borders  between  the  Member 
States fiscally in the same manner as equivalent domestic 
investments. 
1)  Compare the Programme for the harmonization of taxes, information 
of the Committee to the Council, given on 8-2-67, page 4 (Supplement 
Bulletin Nr. 8-1967  of the European Economic Community). 
2)  "Mesures  d'amenagements  en  matiere  d'impots  directs  en  vue  de 
faciliter  Ie  developpement et )'interpenetration des  marches de  capi-
taux  dans Ia  Communaute economique europeenne", 5 March  1969, 
COM (69) 201. 
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138.  By  equality  of fiscal  treatment  it  is  not  meant 
here that on domestic investments and analogous border 
crossing investments the same tax amount is due. 
The  differences  between  the  national  tax  systems  as 
regards  the  determination  of the  tax  base,  as  regards 
the rates and as to the realization of the legal provisions, 
unavoidably lead  to  differences in  the tax amounts due. 
Those  differences  could  only  be  reduced  or removed 
by means  of a  harmonization of legislation and imple-
mentation in respect of the points mentioned, a problem 
which  is  not  under  discussion  here.  The  equality  of 
fiscal  treatment of domestic and border crossing invest-
ments, which is put here as a postulate, can be tested as 
follows. 
In  order  to  eliminate  the  differences  caused  by  the 
factors  mentioned  above,  it  is  assumed  that  the  tax 
base,  the  rates  and  the  implementation  of the  tax  are 
equal in  all  countries. The test of equal fiscal treatment 
implies the question whether under these circumstances 
a system: 
(i)  is  neutral  in  respect of the investment by  residents 
in  their own country or abroad; 
(ii) is neutral in respect of the investment by residents or 
non-residents. 
139.  In  the  following  this  test  will  be  applied,  which 
gives  to the conception of equal fiscal  treatment a sub-
stance which in this connection is appropriate. However 
much  one's  opinion  can  differ  on  the  question  as  to 
what  extent  and  in  what  pace  harmonization  between 
the  Member  States  of rates,  determination  of the  tax 
base,  etc.  is  necessary  for  a  good  functioning  of the 
Common Market, it is certain that a tax structure which 
considerably  fails  in  the  realization  of  equal  fiscal 
treatment  in  the  sense  indicated  is  not  a  good  basis 
for such a harmonization. Such a system, on the contrary, 
can  be  a  lasting  impediment  to  having  the  Common 
Market approach  an  internal  market and  thus form  an 
impediment  to the achievement of the objectives men-
tioned. 
140.  The indicated conception of equal fiscal treatment 
is  wider than the  requirement of non-discrimination as 
this has been laid down in treaties. 
Sometimes the non-discrimination stipulation is confined 
to  the  prevention  of  discrimination  on  the  basis  of 
nationality.  In  numerous  tax  treaties  the non-discrimi-
nation  extends  to  the  shareholdership  of residents  of 
the  treaty partner and to  permanent establishments of 
those  residents  (see  the  notes  to  sections  84  and  93). 
The requirement  of equal  fiscal  treatment also  covers 
other categories of cases  and also concerns privileged 
treatment of non-residents in the context of taxation in 
the  source  country  (an  example  of  an  involuntary 
privilege  has  been mentioned in  section 90). System A 
141.  The test of equal fiscal  treatment is complied with 
by system A. For the cases with an international element, 
this  system has  only to be supplemented by  provisions 
for  the  avoidance  of  international  double  taxation 
(section 78). 
Systems B and C 
I42.  From the analysis  in  chapter  III  it  follows  that 
a similar judgement is not possible in respect of systems 
B and C. These systems inevitably cause differences in 
fiscal  treatment  between  domestic  and  international 
cases. 
Of  the  various  variants  of system  C,  system  C I  is 
discussed  hereafter  together  with  system  B,  to  which 
it  resembles  when  judged  ff"om  the  material  results. 
System C II remains aside because it cannot be applied 
in a satisfactory way. 
System C III 
I43.  System C III is the variant of system C which is 
applied in  France.  Its purport is  that no moderation of 
the economic  double  taxation  is  granted in cases with 
an  international  element.  Equality  of fiscal  treatment 
does  not  exist  in  this  system  (sections  104-111).  The 
French Government has  given  evidence of its  willing-
ness to enter into negotiations on the removal of  the fiscal 
discrimination  against non-residents, but exclusively in 
the relation with other Member States of the European 
Communities.  It  is  said  that  such  negotiations  have 
taken  place  with  the  Federal  German  Republic;  the 
result  has  not  been  published.  The  contents  of the 
regulations,  to  which  such  a  bilateral  consultation 
could  lead,  will  be  dealt with  hereafter in  the  discus-
sion of system C I. It will suffice to mention two points 
here.  In the first place a bilateral regulation can impede 
further progress on the road to the removal of  distortions. 
Furthermore, a  restriction of the measures to be taken 
to  the  relationship  with  other  Member  States, also  if 
these  measures  are  of a  multilateral  character, would 
tend to have  the  result that" the  discriminatory effects 
of the  French  system,  in  respect  of other countries, 
would continue to exist. These measures would in that 
case also  involve the other Member States in  the aut-
arctic tendencies of the  French system. 
System B and C I 
I44.  The  differences  in  fiscal  treatment  between 
domestic  cases  and  international  cases  are  smallest 
in  systems  B  and  C,  if the  broad  conception is  held 
according  to  which  non-residents  are  also  entitled  to 
the  moderation for  the avoidance  of economic  double 
taxation.  That broad conception fits  in  with  system B 
(section 85), which in the form discussed is in accordance 
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with the main principles of the legislation of the Federal 
German  Republic.  In. system  C  the  broad  conception 
leads to system C I (sections 97 et seq.). 
145.  The effects  of systems  B and  C I  in  cases with 
an international  element  are essentially the same from 
a  material  point of view.  In the sphere of investments 
in  shares  by  natural  persons  or share  companies,  the 
test of equal  fiscal  treatment is  satisfied.  In the other 
categories of cases, however, the difficulties  described 
in section 95 present themselves, which lead to inequality 
of fiscal  treatment of domestic and international cases. 
146.  These difficulties  arise  specifically from  the fact 
that  in  the  case  of taxation  of outgoing  participation 
dividends  and  of profits  of permanent  establishments 
of foreign enterprises, regulations "a forfait" have to be 
accepted. These agreed regulations at most bring about 
an  approximate  balance  between  the  tax  regimes  for 
dividends  and profits  remaining in  the country and for 
those  going  abroad.  If one  considers  the  individual 
cases,  then  it  appears  that  the  requirement  of equal 
treatment  of similar  cases  is  not  complied  with.  The 
individual micro-economic equality is, however, of great 
significance from a point of view of  avoidance of  competi-
tion and other distortions.  For the good functioning of 
the  Common Market it is  perhaps more essential than 
a  global  equilibrium  of the  regimes.  To achieve  this 
it  is  required  that  the  taxation  on outgoing  dividends 
and profits takes place with due regard to the circum-
stances  relevant  to  the  system, as  they  present them-
selves  in  the individual case. This means that for each 
of these  dividends  and  profits  it  would  have  to  be 
determined  separately in  how far  their destination en-
titles  the application  of the  lower rate,  or a  refund of 
part of the corporation tax. 
On  a  participation  dividend  which  leaves  a  country 
employing  system  B,  a  "Nachsteuer" in  the  form  of 
dividend tax should not be imposed, if it is  established 
that the dividend must be considered to have been fully 
distributed to investors by the foreign parent company. 
As far as that is  not the case, the dividend ought to be 
charged  to  dividend  tax  amounting  to  the  full  ecart 
between  the  two  rates  of the  corporation  tax,  since 
concern-dividends  remaining in  the country, which are 
not  passed  on,  are  subject  to  a  "Nachsteuer" of the 
same  amount.  For profits of permanent establishments 
belonging  to  foreign  companies it  must be  established, 
in  a  similar way,  how far  they come under the low  or 
under the high rate of the corporation tax. The foregoing 
is  also  applicable,  mutatis  mutandis, to system C. 
147.  For the  application  outlined  above of system  B 
or  system  C  on  outgoing  participation  dividends,  the 
co-operation of the country where the parent company 
or the head office of the enterprise is established would 
be required. In a treaty for administrative assistance and exchange of information the mutual rights and obligations 
of the countries would have to be regulated. According 
to such a treaty the tax administration of that country 
would  have  to  supply  the data concerning the size and 
nature of the distributions of the parent company (or of 
the company owning the permanent establishment) and 
concerning  the  volume,  composition  and  origin  of its 
total  profit,  which  are  necessary  in  order that the tax 
administration and  the Courts of the other country can 
judge in  how far the outgoing dividend or the outgoing 
profit  can  be  considered  to  have  been distributed and 
which  imposition  (in  system  B),  or which  ·refund  (in 
system  C)  must  consequently  be  applied.  The  tax 
officials  of the country which  provides the information 
must have sufficient knowledge of the legislation and the 
judicial  system  in  the  country  asking  information,  in 
order to be able, in their investigation, to distinguish bet-
ween  relevant and non-relevant data. 
148.  It will  also  often happen that the country of the 
parent  company  or  the  head  office  of the  enterprise 
does not have all  data which are necessary for an exact 
application of system B or C available. This will  occur 
if the  enterprise  established  on  its  territory in  its  turn 
is  a  subsidiary  of a  company  in  a  third  country, with 
which  no  assistance  treaty  of  the  above  mentioned 
wide character exists. In that case one must revert to the 
"a  forfaif'  method,  proportionate  to  the  size  of the 
participation.  If the  policy  of  a  concern  is  directed 
towards  a  strong  retention  of  profit,  the  "a  forfait" 
method will  be fiscally  more advantageous.  In order to 
achieve  that  the  tax  administration  must apply  such  a 
method, the  enterprise will  channel the dividend or the 
profit  to an affiliated  company in  a third country with 
which a treaty for the avoidance of international double 
taxation does exist, but no assistance treaty in the above 
sense. 
149.  It is  to be assumed that many  countries will  not 
be prepared to provide detailed information to a foreign 
administration on the enterprises in their country. Indeed, 
they  have  no  fiscal  interest  in  the  exchange  of such 
information,  unless  they  apply  system  B or C I them-
selves.  There is  no  reason to assume that in  the Euro-
pean Communities a different view will be taken. Should, 
however,  all  Member States  be  prepared  to  exchange 
information,  in  order  to  make  it  possible  to  apply  a 
harmonized  system  B  or  C I  in  all  Member  States, 
without  having  to  content  themselves,  also  in  their 
mutual relations, with approximate "a forfait" regulations, 
then  that application  would in  practice, for the reasons 
mentioned  in  section  148,  still  show  considerable 
defects  from  a point of view  of equal  fiscal  treatment. 
VI-Conclusions 
150.  In  chapters  II-IV  the  socio-economic  and  tech-
nical  aspects  of  a  number  of  tax  structures  have 
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been  examined,  which  regulate  the  relationship 
between  the  individual  income  tax  and  the  corpo-
ration  tax  in  diverging  ways.  It  appeared  that  on  a 
number  of  points  the  uncertainty  as  to  the  causal 
connection  leaves  scope  for  diverging  expectations 
as  to  the  consequences.  The  influence  of  the  tax 
structure can indeed be theoretica11y distinguished from 
the other influences on the price and market mechanism 
and the behaviour of the entrepreneurs, but the effect of 
this  influence  cannot be  determined  separately.  More-
over,. differences  in  the  effects  can  also  be  expected 
according to time and place. Thus, the cyclical situation 
will  have  an  influence  on the extent of shifting of the 
tax, on the demand and supply on the capital market, and 
on  the  extent to which  entrepreneurs, in  view of their 
investment intentions on the one hand and their intentions 
to attract fresh capital on the other hand, will be inclined 
to distribute profit.  The influence of a system will  also 
differ according to the country where it is applied. The 
national  socio-economic  situation,  institutional  factors, 
the fiscal  tradition  and  the tax  morality lead inevitably 
to the consequence that the effects of  a system diverge on 
a number of points from one country to another. 
I 5  I.  While the foregoing remarks concern the problem 
of the objective determination of the nature and the size 
of the effects to be expected, when attaching importance 
to  those  effects  one  enters  the field  of subjective  ap-
praisal. Those appraisals are based on a particular view 
of society  and  on  the possibilities  and  desirabilities of 
its  future  development.  The  influence  of the  national 
background of the person making the appraisal is  often 
unmistakable here. 
152.  With  an  the  reservation  ensuing  from  the  two 
preceding sections, an effort is made hereafter to evaluate 
the effects of the systems, as they have appeared in the 
chapters  II-IV, and to  weigh  them against each other, 
in  order to come to a summarizing judgment as  to the 
practical  applicability of the various  systems, with due 
observanc"e  of the  objectives  of European  integration. 
153.  Of the  six  systems  examined, the three systems 
which have been discussed in chapter IV prove not to be 
eligible,  for  numerous  reasons,  for  acceptance  as  a 
harmonized  system  in  the  countries  of the  European 
Communities. Hereafter only systems A (classic system), 
B  (system  of a  double  rate)  and  C  (system  of credit) 
will  therefore  be  discussed. 
154.  In  the  domestic  sphere  the  effects  of system  B 
and those of system C, with an equal rate for the retained 
profit and an equal degree of integration of corporation 
tax  and  individual  income  tax,  presumably  resemble 
each  other very  much, whereby a reservation must  be 
made  for  the  period  shortly  after  the  introduction  of 
an  alteration of the system (see the notes to section 31 
and section 42). The difference between the two systems (section 23)  leads to a number of differences of a  more 
technical nature, which were discussed in sections 26-27 
and 68-72.  System C  in  general  shows a greater flexi-
bility,  perhaps  particularly  appearing  from  the  fact 
that there remains  more  scope for conducting a  policy 
of dividend  equalization  by  enterprises.  Whether  the 
two  systems  give  a  diverging  result  as  regards  the 
shifting  of tax,  is  very uncertain.  It is  possible  that in 
system C, which  only leads to mitigation in  the sphere 
of  the  shareholder,  shifting  occurs  to  a  somewhat 
greater  extent,  but  it  does  not  seem  to  be  excluded 
that,  under  certain  circumstances,  the  contrary is  the 
case (sections 31  et seq.). 
155.  The many points of resemblance between systems 
B  and  C  make  it  possible  to  compare  both  systems 
together  with  system  A.  In a  few  respects  that com-
parison is  favourable to systems  B and C.  Presumably 
their effect is somewhat more neutral than that of system 
A as far as the choice of the legal form of the enterprise 
is  concerned  (sections  47-50),  whereby  it  must  be 
understood  that  the  need  for  special  fiscal  provisions 
is  greater for the private share company.  Furthermore, 
under  systems  B  and  C  there  are  smaller differences 
in  the fiscal  consequences of the financing with equity, 
or loan  capital  than  under system  A  (sections  51-54). 
There is a weaker stimulus in system A to incur expenses 
which, from a  business point of view, are not justified 
(section 55).  On the point of shifting, system A perhaps 
occupies  a  middle position between systems B and C; 
one  should  be  reminded,  however,  of the  reservation 
made in  section  154  in respect of the great uncertainty 
in this field. 
As regards the points mentioned here, there will be little 
difference  of opinion  on  the  desiderata;  the  influence 
which  these  systems  in  fact  exercise  on  these  points 
remains, however, of a hypothetical nature. 
156.  The situation is  somewhat different as to the in-
fluence of the systems on the dividend quota. It is to be 
assumed  that,  in  any  case in  the  long  run, systems  B 
and C will lead to a higher dividend quota than system A, 
although,  for  the reasons  given  in  sections  41  and 46, 
the effect is not to be over-rated; the question whether 
this  effect  is  desirable  will,  however,  be  answered 
differently.  Apart from  the more fundamental points of 
view, mentioned in section 40,  a question of particular 
importance is  whether the most important. effect, i.e.  a 
presumably  relatively  small  increase  of consumption, 
is positively estimated as a structural consequence. 
157.  The differences between systems B and C on the 
one hand and system C  on the other hand are consid-
erable  from  a  point of view of the  implementation of 
the tax. Both systems B and C, compared with system A, 
imply  numerous  special  technical  complications,  be  it 
that  their  nature  and  position  (sections  66-73)  in  the 
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two systems are different. Those complications make the 
task of the tax administration heavier and constitute an 
extra burden for  the  taxpayers.  When  considering  the 
question  of  ~hich system  is  the  most  suitable  to  be 
accepted  as  a  harmonized  system  in  the  European 
Communities, the technical factor must count for -special 
attention,  also  in  view  of  the  harmonization  of  the 
means  of application  of the harmonized system.  Since 
the  balance  of the  socio-economic  effects,  mentioned 
in  the  preceding  sections,  gives  an  uncertain  result, 
this factor of direct practical significance can be consid-
ered to be of sufficient importance to prefer system A, 
if only on account of the effects in the domestic sphere. 
158.  In  the  international  sphere  distinction  must  be 
made between different  variants of system C.  The fol-
lowing  classification  of systems  that could  be  applied, 
seems the most suitable. 
1.  System  A.  This  system  realizes  the  equality  of 
fiscal  treatment  in  the  sense  of chapter  IV.  The 
avoidance of intern'ational  double  taxation does  not 
present difficulties (section 76). 
2.  Systems B and C I. In these two systems equality of 
fiscal  treatment  is  achieved  for  non-resident  and 
resident  investors  in  domestic  shares  (sections  95 
and 97), it being understood that for this in system C I 
a  refund  to  non-resident  investors  is  necessary.  In 
other categories of cases the situation is  that, in  the 
presence of an international element, an implementa-
tion of the  system in  accordance with  the domestic 
application,  recoils from  a  lack  of the relevant data 
necessary for that implementation (sections 146-148). 
In  respect  of participation  dividends  going  abroad 
and in  respect of the profit o( permanent establish-
ments  of foreign  enterprises, regulations "a forfait" 
must  therefore  be  accepted  which  do  not  make 
allowance  for  the  circumstances  of the  individual 
case  (sections  88-94,  100-101,  146-148).  These 
regulations are, for participation dividends, expressed 
in  "border adjustments" in the form of an "a forfait" 
dividend  tax (in  system B)  or an "a forfait"  refund 
(in system C I).  The maintenance of such "a forfait" 
border adjustments in treaties sometimes proves not 
to be fully possible in system B (section 90). Systems 
B and C I can encourage import of capital, but also 
a  flight  from  taxation  (section  95).  On  numerous 
points the test of  equal fiscal treatment is not satisfied. 
3.  System  C III.  In this  system  the  mitigation  of the 
economic double taxation in only granted in strictly 
domestic  cases,  that  is,  when  no  international 
element whatever is  involved (sections  104  et seq.). 
Share  companies  with  non-resident  shareholders 
may  be  subject to  an  additional  tax in  the form of 
the "precompte" (sections  106-108).  The system has an  autarchic  tendency.  It discourages  both  invest-
ments  from  abroad and  investments abroad by  res-
idents (section 111). 
I  59.  If the  domestic  and  the  international  aspects 
of the  systems  are  reviewed  together,  the  conclusion 
seems to be justified that system A is the most suitable 
to be adopted as a harmonized system in  the European 
Communities. 
160.  In the  transitional  period  towards  a  harmonized 
system, it would be desirable that the Belgian and French 
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systems,  which  are  both of type  C  III, are altered to 
systems of type C I. 
161.  As  to  the  regulations  "a forfait"  in  the  systems 
B  and  C I  with  regard  to  participation dividends  and 
profit of permanent establishments such a scope should 
be  given  during  the  transitional  period  towards  a har-
monized system that the inequality of fiscal treatment of 
cases in the domestic sphere on the one hand, and those 
with an international element on the other. hand, is restric-
ted as much as possible. STUDIES 
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